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1 
AT LONG LAST MARRIAGE 
JACK B. HARRISON* 
ABSTRACT 
Over time, the Supreme Court has made clear its belief that marriage is one of 
the most significant and fundamental rights provided protection under the 
Constitution.  In his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas 
characterized marriage as a “coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the [point] of being sacred[,]” describing it as “an 
association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony in living . . . [and] a 
bilateral loyalty.”  The Court in Griswold clearly found that marriage was 
deserving of protection not solely because it was the locus for procreation and the 
rearing of children, but rather that there was some protectable liberty interest 
inherent in the institution of marriage itself.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Zablocki v. Redhail, state regulation is limited to those “reasonable regulations 
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship.”  The state may adopt more intrusive or limiting restrictions on the 
right to marry only if they are “supported by sufficiently important state interests 
and [are] closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.” 
On May 30, 2015, a sweltering May day, I stood on the roof of the Bryant Park 
Grille in New York City officiating at the wedding of two wonderful young men, 
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one of whom I have been close friends with for over fifteen years.  As I looked out 
over Bryant Park prior to the start of the ceremony, I was overcome by joy at the 
momentous nature of the day and overwhelmed by the realization that we were in a 
historic moment that I never imagined I would live to see.  Here I stood, a gay man 
in his fifties who had been toiling in the vineyard of the gay rights movement for 
over thirty years, as an activist and a teacher, bearing witness to a marriage 
between two loving men that was recognized as legal by the State of New York and 
by the United States.  As one who lived through the horrid days of the early AIDS 
crisis and buried way too many friends along the way, I also could not help but 
think of all those too numerous to name who were not there to bear witness to such 
an amazing day.  Throughout all these years, I have watched and represented 
loving gay and lesbian couples as they struggled to piece together some legal 
protections for their relationship and their children in the face of a hostile, if not 
indifferent, legal system.  Some marvel at the rapidity with which the legal changes 
surrounding same sex marriage have occurred.  But this marveling only ignores 
the blood, sweat, tears, and death over centuries that led us to this historic 
moment. 
While this article is certainly about the legal process that led to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell, recognizing that state prohibitions on same sex 
marriages are unconstitutional, it is also deeply personal, in that all the stories 
that led us to this moment are somehow also my story.  Part II of this article 
explores the development of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence related to the 
application of the doctrines of equal protection and due process through Romer, 
Lawrence, and Windsor, the trilogy of gay rights cases in which he wrote for the 
Supreme Court prior to Obergefell.  This discussion culminates in an analysis of 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in U.S. v. Windsor, which provided the basis 
for a vast expansion of the right of same sex couples to marry across the country, 
ultimately placing the issue squarely before the Supreme Court in Obergefell.  Part 
III then examines the impact Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor had on the 
United States Courts of Appeals addressing the constitutionality of state bans 
prohibiting the recognition of same sex marriage, leading to the decision in 
Obergefell.  Part IV then provides an extensive examination of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell.  Part V, the conclusion, examines the aftermath of 
the Court’s decision in Obergefell, placing Obergefell in its proper context in the 
journey for greater inclusion of and protection for gay and lesbian persons and 
identifying some of the very complex issues that still lay ahead in the journey 
toward a structural and institutional formal equality regime. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
We queers of Revelation hill, tucking our skirts about us so as not to 
touch our Mormon neighbors, died of the greed of power, because we 
were expendable.  If you mean to visit any of us, it had better be to make 
you strong to fight that power.  Take your languor and easy tears 
somewhere else.  Above all, don’t pretty us up.  Tell yourself: None of 
this ever had to happen.  And then go make it stop, with whatever breath 
you have left.  Grief is a sword, or it is nothing.1  
 
On May 30, 2015, a sweltering Saturday, I stood on the roof of the 
Bryant Park Grille in New York City officiating at the wedding of two 
wonderful young men, one of whom I have been close friends with for over 
fifteen years.2  As I looked out over Bryant Park prior to the start of the 
                                                            
 1.  PAUL MONETTE, LAST WATCH OF THE NIGHT: ESSAYS TOO PERSONAL AND 
OTHERWISE 115 (1st ed., Harcourt Brace 1994).  This article is dedicated to my fellow 
Cincinnatian, Jim Obergefell, Jim’s late husband, John Arthur, all of the brave 
plaintiffs and attorneys who stood tall and brought these cases, and most especially, all 
of those amazing gay and lesbian persons who emerged proudly from their closets and 
fought hard over decades, including those many – the queers of Revelation Hill—who 
are not here to bear witness. 
 2.  Weddings, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 31, 2015), 
3
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ceremony, I was overcome by joy at the momentous nature of the day and 
overwhelmed by the realization that we were in a historic moment that I 
never imagined I would live to see.  Here I stood, a gay man in his fifties 
who had been toiling in the vineyard of the gay rights movement for over 
thirty years, as an activist, as an attorney, and as a teacher, bearing witness 
to a marriage between two loving men that was recognized as legal by the 
State of New York and by the United States. 
As one who lived through the horrid days of the early AIDS crisis and 
buried too many friends along the way, I also could not help to think of all 
those too numerous to name who were not there to bear witness to such an 
amazing day.  Throughout all these years, I have watched and represented 
loving gay and lesbian couples as they struggled to piece together some 
legal protections for their relationships and their children in the face of a 
hostile, if not indifferent, legal system.  Some marvel at the rapidity with 
which the legal changes surrounding same sex marriage have occurred.  
But this marveling only ignores the blood, sweat, tears, and death over 
centuries that led us to this historic moment. 
I certainly realize that beginning a law review article with such a bold 
personal reflection is not ideal, but on this specific issue, I would ask for a 
bit of indulgence.  While this article is certainly about the legal process that 
led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, recognizing that state 
prohibitions on same sex marriages are unconstitutional,3 it is also deeply 
personal because all the stories that led to this moment are somehow also 
my story. 
Part II of this article explores the development of Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence related to the application of the doctrines of equal protection 
and due process through Romer,4 Lawrence,5 and Windsor,6 the trilogy of 
gay rights cases in which he wrote for the Supreme Court prior to 
Obergefell.7  This discussion culminates in an analysis of Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in U.S. v. Windsor,8 which provided the basis 
for a vast expansion of the right of same sex couples to marry across the 
country, ultimately placing the issue squarely before the Supreme Court for 
decision in Obergefell.  Part III then examines the impact Justice 
                                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/fashion/weddings/jonathan-gregg-derek-
mize.html?_r=0. 
 3.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 4.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 5.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 6.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 7.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 8.  See discussion infra Part II-C. 
4
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/1
HARRISON 10/1/15 (DO NOT DELETE)  
2015] AT LONG LAST MARRIAGE 5 
Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor had on the United States Courts of Appeals 
addressing the constitutionality of state bans prohibiting the recognition of 
same sex marriage, leading to the decision in Obergefell.  Part IV then 
provides an extensive examination of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell, looking first at the oral arguments before the Court and then the 
decision itself.  Part V, the conclusion, examines the aftermath of the 
Court’s decision in Obergefell, placing Obergefell in its proper context in 
the journey for greater inclusion of and protection for gay and lesbian 
persons and identifying some of the very complex issues that still lay 
ahead. 
II.  THE LEGAL ROAD TO OBERGEFELL: ROMER TO LAWRENCE 
TO WINDSOR 
Since 1996, Justice Anthony Kennedy has authored three opinions that 
have formed the structure of his developing jurisprudence related to equal 
protection and due process.  In these opinions, Justice Kennedy bypassed 
the Supreme Court’s historical analysis of both equal protection and due 
process, focusing instead on an analysis that was rooted in the ideas of 
liberty, dignity, and equality.9  While the analysis in this trilogy was 
anything but clear, it was consistent. 
As this article explores, in Windsor, Justice Kennedy’s analysis provided 
the basis for lower courts to almost universally strike down prohibitions 
                                                            
 9.  An earlier version of this discussion of the development of Justice Kennedy’s 
gay rights jurisprudence appeared in Jack B. Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 
OHIO N. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600548 [hereinafter Harrison, On 
Marriage and Polygamy].  See generally Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and 
Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014).  See 
also, Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011); Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011); Reva B. Siegel, 
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 
117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups 
and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The ‘Fundamental Right’ That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, 
and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1183 (2000); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the 
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation 
and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Sexual Orientation 
and the Constitution]; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: 
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) 
[hereinafter Karst, The Supreme Court]. 
5
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against the marriage of same sex couples.  On January 16, 2015, the Court 
granted certiorari in four cases emanating from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to determine whether prohibitions against 
same sex marriage were constitutional.10  In answering this question in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,11 Justice Kennedy had the deciding vote in a case 
involving the rights of gay and lesbian couples.  Consistent with the 
analysis he developed in the trilogy of cases discussed below, in 
Obergefell, Justice Kennedy further expanded the analytical trajectory 
established through these prior cases. 
A.  Romer v. Evans12 
Romer focused on a Colorado constitutional amendment, Amendment 2, 
designed to prohibit any statute, regulation, or ordinance that would 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.13  As a result of the 
passage of Amendment 2, local and municipal laws and certain state 
regulations that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation were 
declared invalid.14  Further, as a result of Amendment 2 and its concomitant 
prohibitions on political action that would address discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, gay and lesbian persons were, in effect, denied the 
opportunity to work through the political process to protect their interests.15 
The Colorado Supreme Court declared Amendment 2 unconstitutional 
and held that the amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because 
it violated “the fundamental right to participate equally in the political 
process.”16  Since the court concluded that the Amendment violated a 
fundamental constitutional right, the court applied strict scrutiny in 
analyzing Amendment 2.17 
On remand, while the state put forward six interests that it asserted were 
compelling, the trial court concluded that the state had failed to meet its 
burden to show a compelling interest supporting the Amendment and 
entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the 
                                                            
 10.  Lyle Denniston, Court Will Rule on Same-Sex Marriage (UPDATED), 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 16, 2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/court-
will-rule-on-same-sex-marriage/ [hereinafter Denniston, Court Will Rule on Same-Sex 
Marriage]. 
 11.  See discussion infra Part V. 
 12.  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 618 (1996). 
 13.  See id. at 623-24. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 624. 
 16.  Id. at 629, 631. 
 17.  Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
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amendment.18  In the second appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision, leading the Defendants to appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court.19 
Writing for a six justice majority, Justice Kennedy rejected the interests 
that had been offered by the state to support Amendment 2: (1) that the 
amendment furthered freedom of association by protecting the interests of 
those in Colorado who had “personal or religious objections to 
homosexuality” and (2) that the amendment acted to “conserve resources to 
fight discrimination against other groups.”20 
Justice Kennedy began the opinion by quoting from Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, stating “that the Constitution ‘neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”  In analyzing Amendment 2, Justice 
Kennedy nominally rejected the use of a strict scrutiny standard of review, 
opting instead to analyze the Amendment under a rational basis standard.  
As Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s promise that no person shall be denied the 
equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that 
most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting 
disadvantage to various groups or persons.  Personnel Administrator of 
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271–272, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2292, 60 
L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 
415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 561–562, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).  We have attempted to 
reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither 
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold 
the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some 
legitimate end.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320, 113 S. 
Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).21 
 
However, what was not clear in the opinion was exactly what form of 
rational basis analysis Justice Kennedy was employing.22 
                                                            
 18.  Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339-40, 1349 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). 
 19.  Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 631. 
 22.  See Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding of Equal 
Protection and Due Process, and its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 452-53 (2014).  
As Farrell has written: 
 
Kennedy’s unwillingness to be forthright in conceding that he was applying a 
heightened standard of review is a longstanding problem with the Supreme Court’s 
rational-basis-review decisions.  Rational basis review purports to be one standard—
that a classification be rationally related to a permissible purpose.  But, in practice, this 
7
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In Romer, Justice Kennedy began his discussion of rational basis with a 
nod to his own prior opinion in Heller v. Doe,23 suggesting that he intended 
to employ the much more deferential version of rational basis analysis.  
However, in the conclusion of his analysis, Justice Kennedy cited as 
authority for his analysis and for the ultimate decision regarding 
Amendment 2, the heightened rational basis review that the Court 
employed in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.24 
                                                            
one standard is in fact two, with different methods that produce different results.  
Rationality review is, in most cases, so deferential as to amount to no review at all.  
This extreme deference results because, when applying the standard, the Court (1) does 
not look for evidence of actual purpose but will hypothesize purpose or accept the post 
hoc rationalizations of government attorneys as to purpose; (2) does not insist that there 
be an actual correlation between the challenged classification and purpose but only that 
the government could have plausibly believed that there was such a connection, even if 
the government is wrong in that belief; (3) places on the challenger the burden of 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceivable basis which might 
support it (an impossible burden); and (4) does not invalidate statutes on the basis of an 
impermissible purpose, since the Court is not looking for an actual purpose that might 
invalidate a statute but rather is hypothesizing a purpose that will validate it.  
  
Occasionally and without explanation, the Court applies a heightened version of 
rational basis review where it puts aside the deferential techniques identified in the 
previous paragraph and, by contrast, (1) aggressively looks for evidence of the actual 
purpose of a statute and (2) having identified such actual purpose, rules out as 
impermissible the purpose of harming a particular group or (3) insists that the 
challenged classification actually advance a permissible state interest.  Before Romer, 
the two most prominent cases in which the Court had applied this heightened rational 
basis review were U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.  In the first of these cases, the Court invalidated an amendment to the 
Food Stamp Act on the ground that the amendment had been motivated by a bare desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group (hippies).  In the second, the Court invalidated a 
decision by city government that had denied a permit for a group home for the mentally 
disabled; the Court found that the denial was motivated by “an irrational prejudice 
against the mentally retarded . . . .”  In neither of these cases did the Court look to 
hypothetical purposes that might have justified the challenged classifications nor did it 
give the government defendant the benefit of the doubt as to whether it had acted 
reasonably even if wrongly.  
Id. 
 23.  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 318 (1993). 
 24.  Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).  In so doing, Kennedy 
wrote: 
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable 
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected.  “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”  
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 93 S. Ct. 2821, 2826, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 
8
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In Romer, Justice Kennedy was clearly analyzing Amendment 2 under 
some form of heightened rational basis, assuming the standard of review is 
rational basis at all.  However, in Romer and in the other two cases in the 
trilogy, Justice Kennedy never expressly stated what form of rational basis 
he was actually employing.  However, Romer itself provides ample 
evidence that had Justice Kennedy not employed a heightened standard of 
review, the ultimate decision in the case would have been different.25  
                                                            
(1973).  Even laws enacted for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained by 
reference to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they 
impose on certain persons.  Amendment 2, however, in making a general 
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the 
law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any 
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.  We conclude that, in addition to the 
far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2 that we have noted, the principles it offends, 
in another sense, are conventional and venerable; a law must bear a rational 
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public 
Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 462, 108 S. Ct. 2481, 2489–2490, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988), and 
Amendment 2 does not. 
  
The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’ 
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who 
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.  Colorado also cites its interest 
in conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups.  The breadth of the 
amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it 
impossible to credit them.  We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any 
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.  It is a status-based enactment 
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to 
legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, 
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.  “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] 
obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”  Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. at 24; 3 S. Ct. at 30. 
 
Romer, 517 U.S at 634-35.   
 25.  As one commentator has noted:  
[Romer], without doubt, applies the more demanding form of rationality review, but 
Kennedy neither acknowledges that fact nor concedes that the decision would have to 
come out differently if he were applying the traditional deferential version.  If he had 
been using the deferential version, Kennedy would have had to consider other purposes 
that might have motivated Amendment 2, both those advanced by its proponents and 
those he might hypothesize on his own.  It is clear that either of the purposes advanced 
by the proponents—protecting freedom of association and focusing on discrimination 
against other groups—is permissible and might have, in fact, been a purpose of the 
Amendment.  Further, it would not matter whether Amendment 2 would actually have 
advanced these purposes, but only whether the Colorado voters might reasonably have 
perceived a connection.  Finally, the challengers would have had to negative every 
conceivable basis that might have supported the Amendment, something that they did 
not do and could never do.   
9
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In a very strong dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that 
rational basis is the appropriate standard of review.  However, Justice 
Scalia felt that there existed a clear justification for Amendment 2 under 
traditional rational basis review, stating: 
 
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.  The 
constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a “ 
‘bare . . . desire to harm’ “ homosexuals, ante, at 1628, but is rather a 
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional 
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to 
revise those mores through use of the laws.  That objective, and the 
means chosen to achieve it, are not only unimpeachable under any 
constitutional doctrine hitherto pronounced (hence the opinion’s heavy 
reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial holdings); 
they have been specifically approved by the Congress of the United 
States and by this Court. 
 
In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable 
treatment, the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, 
pronounced only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
106 S. Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), and places the prestige of this 
institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as 
reprehensible as racial or religious bias.  Whether it is or not is precisely 
the cultural debate that gave rise to the Colorado constitutional 
amendment (and to the preferential laws against which the amendment 
was directed).  Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing 
about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal democratic means, 
including the democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions.  
This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution 
favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are 
selected, pronouncing that “animosity” toward homosexuality, ante, at 
1628, is evil.26 
 
Justice Scalia clearly recognized that by placing homosexuality on an 
analytical footing more akin to race or religion, Justice Kennedy was 
employing some sort of heightened review under which majoritarian 
morality would not be seen as a legitimate basis or compelling reason to 
classify persons according to their disfavored status.27 
                                                            
 
Farrell, supra note 22, at 454. 
 26.  Romer, 517 U.S at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27.  For a discussion of Justice Kennedy’s judicial minimalism in Romer, see Cass 
R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term--Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 
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B.  Lawrence v. Texas28 
Lawrence provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to revisit its 
1986 opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, a decision in which the Court had 
upheld Georgia’s statute prohibiting sodomy.  In Lawrence, Houston police 
arrested two men in a private residence for a violation of a Texas criminal 
statute that prohibited “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual 
of the same sex.”29  Following their arrest and charge, the two men 
challenged the constitutionality of the Texas sodomy statute, asserting that 
the statute violated the equal protection clause.30  The trial court did not 
accept this constitutional challenge, so the two men entered a plea of nolo 
contendere, resulting in a fine of $200 each and the assessment of court 
costs for $141.25.31  On appeal, Texas state appellate courts rejected their 
constitutional challenge to the statute, thus leading the case to be heard by 
the Supreme Court.32 
In writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy continued his focus on liberty, 
equality, and dignity, which had been at the heart of his opinion in Romer 
over ten years prior.  Where Justice Kennedy had opened his opinion in 
Romer with reference to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, here, in 
Lawrence, he opened the opinion with a sweeping description of “liberty,” 
writing: 
 
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into 
a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home.  And there are other spheres of our lives and 
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant 
presence.  Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.  Liberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the 
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.33 
 
Following this dramatic opening to the opinion, Justice Kennedy placed 
the question before the Court squarely in the Court’s prior jurisprudence in 
the area of privacy, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut.34  His review 
                                                            
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Supreme Court].  
 28.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 29.  Id. at 562-63. 
 30.  Id. at 563. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. (citing Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. App. 2001)).  
 33.  Id. at 562. 
 34.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
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of these cases clearly indicated that the liberty interest at stake in Lawrence 
was of the same fundamental nature as the liberty interests at stake in the 
Court’s prior privacy cases.35 
With this context established for the case, Justice Kennedy then turned to 
the specific liberty interest at stake in the case, necessitating a review of the 
Court’s prior decision in Bowers. 
Justice Kennedy made it clear that he believed that the Court had 
completely misunderstood the nature of the liberty interest at stake in 
                                                            
 35.  As Justice Kennedy stated: 
After Griswold it was established that the right to make certain decisions regarding 
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.  In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the Court invalidated a law 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.  The case was 
decided under the Equal Protection Clause, id., at 454, 92 S. Ct. 1029; but with respect 
to unmarried persons, the Court went on to state the fundamental proposition that the 
law impaired the exercise of their personal rights, ibid.  It quoted from the statement of 
the Court of Appeals finding the law to be in conflict with fundamental human rights, 
and it followed with this statement of its own: 
 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital 
relationship . . . .  If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”  Id. 
at 453, 92 S. Ct. 1029. 
  
The opinions in Griswold and Eisenstadt were part of the background for the decision 
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).  As is well 
known, the case involved a challenge to the Texas law prohibiting abortions, but the 
laws of other States were affected as well.  Although the Court held the woman’s rights 
were not absolute, her right to elect an abortion did have real and substantial protection 
as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause.  The Court cited cases that 
protect spatial freedom and cases that go well beyond it.  Roe recognized the right of a 
woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed 
once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive 
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person. 
  
In Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 
(1977), the Court confronted a New York law forbidding sale or distribution of 
contraceptive devices to persons under 16 years of age.  Although there was no single 
opinion for the Court, the law was invalidated.  Both Eisenstadt and Carey, as well as 
the holding and rationale in Roe, confirmed that the reasoning of Griswold could not be 
confined to the protection of rights of married adults.  This was the state of the law 
with respect to some of the most relevant cases when the Court considered Bowers v. 
Hardwick.  
 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-566. 
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Bowers.  As he wrote: 
 
The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as follows: “The 
issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a 
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence 
invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct 
illegal and have done so for a very long time.”  Id., at 190, 106 S. Ct. 
2841.  That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court’s own 
failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.  To say that the 
issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a 
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to 
have sexual intercourse.  The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to 
be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular 
sexual act.  Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual 
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.  The statutes do 
seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to 
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose 
without being punished as criminals.36 
 
As to the continuing validity of Bowers, Justice Kennedy articulated in 
great detail exactly how the Court’s opinion in Bowers misread both history 
and the evolving understanding and acceptance of homosexual persons. 
Justice Kennedy addressed the question of whether his prior opinion in 
Romer formed the basis for striking down the Texas statute on equal 
protection grounds alone, since the statute at issue was homosexual 
specific.  Justice Kennedy did not reject this argument, but rather asserted 
that there is a linkage between due process liberty interests and equality 
that cannot be ignored.37  Justice Kennedy concluded that Bowers was 
                                                            
 36.  Id. at 566-67. 
 37.  Id. at 574-75.  As Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might 
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the 
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants. 
 
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected 
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision 
on the latter point advances both interests.  If protected conduct is made criminal and 
the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might 
remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons.  When 
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of 
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public 
13
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overruled, stating that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it 
is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.”38 
Again, Justice Kennedy was not explicit on the exact standard of review 
he used in his analysis.  Language existed in the opinion pointing in the 
direction of a strict scrutiny standard of review as well as language pointing 
to rational basis.39  This ambiguity has led some scholars and lower courts 
to read Lawrence as applying heightened scrutiny to a regulation of the 
fundamental right to sexual autonomy, while others read the decision as 
applying rational basis analysis.40 
                                                            
and in the private spheres.  The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question 
by this case, and it should be addressed.  Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives 
of homosexual persons. 
  
Id.  
 38.  Id. at 578. 
 39.  See Farrell, supra note 22, at 469-71; Franklin, supra note 9, at 857-63. 
 40.  Farrell, supra note 22, at 469-71.  As Farrell notes: 
 
Since the claim [in Bowers] was one of substantive due process, it might have been 
expected that the Court would have followed the traditional framework for substantive 
due process claims.  The Court would have had to consider whether the governmental 
conduct infringed on an implied fundamental right, and if so, would have required the 
government to show that the infringement was necessary or narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest.  This is what the Court had done in Roe v. Wade, where it found 
that the implied fundamental right of privacy included within it a woman’s decision to 
terminate a pregnancy and thus required the state to show that its intrusion into that 
decision was necessary to a compelling interest.  On the other hand, in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, the Court determined that the conduct regulated by the state—sodomy—was 
not a fundamental right and therefore upheld the challenged statute under the 
deferential test that it be rationally related to the state’s interest in promoting a 
traditional form of morality.  
  
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion never aligned itself entirely with either of 
these standards, although it contained some measure of each.  On the one hand, it 
seems that Lawrence must have identified a fundamental right and applied a heightened 
standard of scrutiny.  Kennedy’s opinion focused throughout on the term “liberty” and 
found that the challenged statute interfered with a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest.  Ordinarily, this finding would be enough to conclude that the conduct in 
question was an implied fundamental right.  Further, Kennedy cited as support for his 
opinion both Roe v. Wade and Carey v. Population Services, cases that insisted that 
when the government infringes on a constitutionally protected liberty, that infringement 
must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.  Kennedy’s opinion had overruled 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which had applied rational basis review in a similar factual 
setting.  The result of Lawrence was to overturn the conviction of the petitioners, a 
result that would have been impossible if the Court had been applying traditional 
deferential rational basis review.   
14
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While this scholarly debate continues, it seems apparent, particularly in 
light of Windsor and Obergefell, that Justice Kennedy invoked some level 
of higher scrutiny in Lawrence, much as he had done in Romer.  It appears 
that Justice Kennedy’s evolving jurisprudence through these cases called 
for a heightened standard of review in those situations where the legitimate 
government interest presented was designed to support a classification or a 
prohibition rooted in majoritarian morality or its counterpoint, majoritarian 
animus. 
C.  United States v. Windsor41 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court faced a challenge to the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).42  Factually, the case involved two women, 
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, who had been lawfully married in Ontario, 
Canada in 2007.43  Subsequently, they returned to their home in New York, 
a state that recognized their marriage.44  Two years later in 2009, Spyer 
died, leaving her entire estate to Windsor.45  As a result of the inheritance, 
Windsor paid more than $350,000 in federal income taxes because Section 
3 of DOMA barred her from using the estate tax exemption for surviving 
spouses – the federal government simply could not recognize her 
marriage.46  Thus, she was forced to pay taxes that she would not have had 
to pay if her deceased spouse had been a man.47  In turn, Windsor sued in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
                                                            
 
On the other hand, although Kennedy’s opinion found that the private conduct 
forbidden by the government was within the realm of liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause, it never expressly said that the conduct was part of an implied 
fundamental right.  Further, the opinion made no reference to the “narrowly tailored to 
a compelling interest” test, which is the standard test the Court applies when 
government invades a fundamental right.  In fact, in his concluding words, Kennedy 
found that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”  At least part of this 
language—”legitimate state interest”—is the language of rational basis review, not 
strict scrutiny.  Thus, both legal scholars and courts have concluded that it is quite 
plausible to read Kennedy’s opinion as having applied rational basis review. 
  
Id. 
 41.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 42.  Id. at 2684. 
 43.  Id. at 2682. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.at 2682. 
 46.  Id. at 2683. 
 47.  Id. 
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challenging Section 3 of DOMA,48 which provided that: 
 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.49 
 
The district court found for Windsor, holding that DOMA was 
unconstitutional because it discriminated based on sexual orientation and 
that DOMA was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.50  
The district court indicated that DOMA was rooted in “a desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group” and, therefore, was subjected to a heightened 
review under the rational basis test.51  On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, but 
took a different analytical approach.52  The Court of Appeals held that 
sexual orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny, 
since gay and lesbian persons constituted a quasi-suspect class, and that 
DOMA could not pass this heightened scrutiny.53  Subsequently, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.54 
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy continued the trajectory from Romer and 
Lawrence, focusing on the inherent interplay among fundamental concepts 
of liberty, dignity, and equality that form the core of his jurisprudence.  
However, in what seemed to be a sleight of hand, Justice Kennedy began 
the opinion in Windsor with a nod to the federalism issues inherent in the 
issue before the Court, namely the intrusion of the federal government into 
the area of the definition of marriage, an issue historically left to the 
states.55  After a fairly comprehensive analysis of federalism in this context, 
Justice Kennedy articulated the issue in Windsor as follows: 
                                                            
 48.  Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 49.  The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
 50.  Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 402. 
 51.  Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 52.  See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(affirming the District Court’s decision after applying heightened scrutiny to Windsor’s 
claim). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307). 
 55.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-93 (2013). 
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The States’ interest in defining and regulating the marital relation, 
subject to constitutional guarantees, stems from the understanding that 
marriage is more than a routine classification for purposes of certain 
statutory benefits.  Private, consensual sexual intimacy between two 
adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it 
can form “but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 
(2003).  By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions 
and same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection and 
dignity to that bond.  For same-sex couples who wished to be married, 
the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.  This status is 
a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship 
between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of 
dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.  It reflects both 
the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the 
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of 
equality.56 
 
Justice Kennedy then concluded that the Court’s decision in Windsor did 
not turn on issues related to federalism at all.  According to Justice 
Kennedy, the federalism issue present in this case had importance only in 
relationship to the dignity and liberty interests of the persons and couples 
impacted by DOMA.57 
                                                            
 56.  Id. at 2692-93. 
 57.  Id. at 2692.  As stated by Justice Kennedy: 
 
Despite these considerations, it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion 
on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.  
The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this case 
quite apart from principles of federalism.  Here the State’s decision to give this class of 
persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.  
When the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in 
this way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, 
dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.  DOMA, because of its 
reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reliance on state law to 
define marriage. “ ‘[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful 
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’ 
“  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) 
(quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38, 48 S. Ct. 423, 72 
L.Ed. 770 (1928)). 
  
The Federal Government uses this state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to 
impose  injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected 
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Having disposed of the federalism issue, Justice Kennedy moved to the 
fundamental analysis in the case focused on both equal protection and due 
process.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor showcases the fundamental 
linkage between equal protection jurisprudence and due process 
jurisprudence that Justice Kennedy developed through this trilogy of cases.  
Windsor is neither a traditional equal protection case nor a traditional 
substantive due process case.  Windsor represents an amalgam of both, 
squarely rooted in liberty as an analytical principle.58 
Windsor, like Romer and Lawrence, is a case about liberty; the Court has 
borrowed “from either or both substantive due process and equal protection 
principles to decide whether a law improperly intrudes upon that sphere of 
autonomy belonging to every citizen and containing within its bounds life’s 
most intimate decisions, actions, and relationships.”59  In this series of gay 
rights cases, Justice Kennedy has provided a dramatic example of what 
Laurence Tribe described in the wake of Lawrence, that “due process and 
equal protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different 
inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.”60 
Again, Justice Kennedy offered little guidance as to the level of scrutiny 
                                                            
by the Fifth Amendment.  What the State of New York treats as alike the federal law 
deems unlike by a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect. 
   
Id. 
 58.  Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of Substantive Due 
Process and Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for the 
Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 272-74 (2014).  Crooks 
describes this dilemma further, stating: 
 
Reasonable minds—including the Justices themselves—disagree about whether the 
“rooted in history and traditions” test applied in Bowers and Glucksberg is still the 
proper framework for evaluating a substantive due process claim.  After all, Casey, 
with its focus on liberty, was decided in 1992.  However, Glucksberg, returning to the 
Bowers-brand of “rooted in history and traditions,” was decided a scant five years later, 
and yet it limited and distinguished Casey.  Then, a mere six years after Glucksberg, 
Lawrence framed the issue in the broad liberty terms that Casey employed and 
Glucksberg was shunned—all without so much as a “see also” acknowledging 
Glucksberg’s existence.  Assuming, as this article does, that Glucksberg represents the 
traditional view of substantive due process, Lawrence is at least a non-traditional 
substantive due process case.  Therefore, if Windsor is anything at all, it is either a non-
traditional, Lawrence-brand substantive due process case or the newest addition to the 
Court’s distinct lineage of liberty cases.   
 
Id. at 273-74.  See also discussion supra Part II, and accompanying citations. 
 59.  Id. at 274. 
 60.  Tribe, supra note 9, at 1898. 
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he was applying.  The court below applied intermediate scrutiny to the 
issues in Windsor because it concluded that the gay couples impacted by 
DOMA were a quasi-suspect class.  Justice Kennedy, however, simply 
chose to ignore this.  Rather, he applied rational basis review, at least, 
nominally.  However, as in both Romer and Lawrence before, Justice 
Kennedy’s language and analysis points to the use of some elevated level 
of scrutiny. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts tried to limit the holding in Windsor 
solely to the issue of federalism.61  However, a careful reading of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion demonstrates that federalism was certainly not the 
determining factor in striking down Section 3 of DOMA. 
In fact, in his very strong and vituperative dissent, Justice Scalia 
demolished the hope that the case could be limited to federalism.  As 
Justice Scalia stated: 
 
There are many remarkable things about the majority’s merits holding.  
The first is how rootless and shifting its justifications are.  For example, 
the opinion starts with seven full pages about the traditional power of 
States to define domestic relations—initially fooling many readers, I am 
sure, into thinking that this is a federalism opinion.  But we are 
eventually told that “it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal 
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution,” and that 
“[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central 
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism” because 
“the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry 
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.”  Ante, at 
2681.  But no one questions the power of the States to define marriage 
(with the concomitant conferral of dignity and status), so what is the 
point of devoting seven pages to describing how long and well 
established that power is? Even after the opinion has formally disclaimed 
reliance upon principles of federalism, mentions of “the usual tradition 
of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” continue.  
See, e.g., ante, at 2681.  What to make of this?  The opinion never 
explains.  My guess is that the majority, while reluctant to suggest that 
defining the meaning of “marriage” in federal statutes is unsupported by 
any of the Federal Government’s enumerated powers, nonetheless needs 
some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today’s prohibition of 
laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal 
Government (leaving the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, 
maybe next Term).  But I am only guessing.62 
 
                                                            
 61.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696-97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 62.  Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia set out a very strong attack on what he has continuously 
seen in the trilogy of opinions of Justice Kennedy outlined in this Part of 
this Article, namely that Justice Kennedy’s melding of due process and 
equal protection analysis under the rubric of liberty places the Court on a 
dangerous path out of traditional constitutional analysis.63 
As discussed below, Justice Scalia was indeed correct.  The next Part of 
this Article addresses decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals 
following Windsor, analyzing how Windsor was read by these lower courts 
in determining the constitutionality of state prohibitions against same sex 
marriage. 
III.  THE DROPPING OF THE “SECOND, STATE-LAW SHOE”: THE 
JOURNEY TO OBERGEFELL 
Many predicted, some perhaps hoped, that because of its seeming 
ambiguity and lack of clarity, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor would 
provide an easy basis for lower courts to distinguish it when confronted 
with cases addressing the constitutionality of state bans on same sex 
marriage.  However, this was not the case.  While it is true that various 
cases addressing the constitutionality of state bans on same sex marriage 
post-Windsor did not all read the analysis in Windsor exactly the same, 
these lower courts have almost universally followed the construct of 
liberty, dignity, and equality developed by Justice Kennedy in the trilogy of 
cases discussed above.64 
A.  The Seventh Circuit – Baskin v. Bogan & Wolf v. Walker 
Baskin v. Bogan was filed in United States District for the Southern 
District of Indiana and is the seminal case challenging Indiana’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.65  The Plaintiffs in Baskin challenged 
section 31-11-1-1 of the Indiana Code and all other Indiana laws precluding 
same-sex marriages and prohibiting their recognition.66 
                                                            
 63.  Id. at 2705-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 64.  See Katie Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis 
Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 566 (2014). 
 65.  Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (S.D. Ind. 2014). The Plaintiffs in 
Baskin are: Rae Baskin and Esther Fuller, an unmarried couple that has been together 
for 24 years, Bonne Everly and Linda Judkins, an unmarried couple that has been 
together for 13 years, Dawn Lynn Carver and Pamela Eanes, a unmarried couple that 
has been together for 17 years, and Nikole Quasney and Amy Sandler, a couple that 
was married in Massachusetts but resides in Indiana.  FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation/entry/indiana (last visited Dec. 23 2014).  
 66.  Section 31-11-1-1: (a) [o]nly a female may marry a male and only a male may 
marry a female; and (b) [a] marriage between persons of the same gender is void in 
Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.  Baskin, 12 F. 
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The district court found section 31-11-1-1(a) of the Indiana Code 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 The district court found section 
31-11-1-1(b) unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.68  In turn, the court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment and permanently enjoined Indiana, its “[o]fficers, agents, 
servants, employees and attorneys,” from enforcing Section 31-11-1-1 
“[a]nd other Indiana laws preventing the celebration or recognition of 
same-sex marriages.”69  Subsequently, the Defendants appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
Wolf v. Walker was filed in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin and is the seminal case challenging 
Wisconsin’s prohibition of same-sex marriage.70  The plaintiffs in Wolf 
challenged Article XIII, § 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution and other 
Wisconsin statutory provisions that limited marriage to a “husband” and a 
“wife.” 71 
The district court held Wisconsin’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.72  In turn, the court granted the 
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and enjoined the Defendants from 
enforcing laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.73  Subsequently, the 
Defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit. 
The Seventh Circuit consolidated Baskin and Wolf for purposes of its 
opinion.  In an opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court and held both Indiana and Wisconsin’s 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional as a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amendment.74 
                                                            
Supp. 3d at 1150. 
 67.  Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1164. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 1164-65. 
 70.  Walker v. Wolf – Freedom to Marry in Wisconsin, ACLU (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/wolf-and-schumacher-v-walker. 
 71.  WIS. CONST. art. 13 § 13 (“[o]nly a marriage between one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in [Wisconsin]. A legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized in [Wisconsin].”); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (W.D. Wis. 
2014). 
 72.  Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1028. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 656. 
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Overall, the Seventh Circuit allowed United States v. Windsor to frame 
its analysis of Indiana and Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage bans.75  The 
court noted that denial of state marital benefits to same-sex couples 
“[b]rings to mind the Supreme Court’s opinion United States v. Windsor, 
which held unconstitutional the denial of all federal marital benefits to 
same-sex marriages recognized by state law.”76  Further, the court averred 
that the Supreme Court’s “[c]riticisms of such denial [in Windsor] apply 
with even greater force to Indiana [and Wisconsin’s] law[s].”77 
With Windsor on its mind, the Seventh Circuit turned to Indiana and 
Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage bans.  The court focused solely on equal 
protection.78  It did not consider the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
amendment to be a necessary part of its ultimate conclusion – that same-
sex marriage bans are unconstitutional.79  The court began its analysis by 
noting that Equal Protection applied because “[I]ndiana and Wisconsin, in 
refusing to authorize [same-sex marriage] . . . are discriminating against 
homosexuals by denying them a right that [Indiana and Wisconsin] grant to 
heterosexuals, namely the right to marry an unmarried adult of their 
choice.”80 
The court’s Equal Protection analysis was relatively unconventional – 
but it sought to embrace conventional equal protection analysis by invoking 
a series of questions to guide its analysis.81  Through this framework, the 
court sought to determine whether the costs imposed on homosexual 
couples by the Indiana and Wisconsin laws outweighed the benefits of 
those laws.82 
                                                            
 75.  Id. at 659. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 656-67. 
 79.  Id. at 656. 
 80.  Id. at 657. 
 81.  “We will engage the states’ arguments on their own terms, enabling us to 
decide our brace of cases on the basis of a sequence of four questions: (1) does the 
challenged practice involve discrimination, rooted in a history of prejudice, against 
some identifiable group of persons, resulting in unequal treatment harmful to them; (2) 
Is the unequal treatment based on some immutable or at least tenacious characteristic of 
the people discriminated against . . .; (3) Does the discrimination, even if based on an 
immutable characteristic, nevertheless confer an important offsetting benefit on society 
as a whole; (4) though it does confer an offsetting benefit, is the discriminatory policy 
overinclusive because the benefit it confers on society could be achieved in a way less 
harmful to the discriminated-against group, or underinclusive because the 
government’s purported rationale for the policy implies that it should equally apply to 
other groups as well . . .” Id. at 655. 
 82.  Id. at 656 (“The difference between the approach we take in these two cases 
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At the outset, the court quoted Justice Thomas’s encapsulation of Equal 
Protection analysis from Beach Communications – “in areas of social and 
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld 
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”83  In 
line with the Beach formula, the court stated that the Indiana and 
Wisconsin laws proceed “along suspect lines” because the laws 
discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic.84  
In turn, the court stated that more than a reasonable basis was required to 
uphold the laws.85 
However, the court did not employ a conventional form of heightened 
scrutiny in reaching its holding.86  The court found that the Indiana and 
Wisconsin did not even have a rational basis for prohibiting same-sex 
marriages.87  The court opined that Indiana and Wisconsin’s 
“[d]iscrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore 
unconstitutional even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened 
scrutiny.”88  This conclusion allowed the court to “largely elide the more 
complex analysis found in more closely balanced equal-protection cases” 
and avoid the Plaintiff’s argument that the states’ ban on same-sex 
marriage violates a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth amendment.89 
Seemingly, then, the court struck down the Indiana and Wisconsin laws 
because they bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.90  
The court stated “[i]t is apparent that groundless rejection of same-sex 
marriage by government must be a denial of equal protection of the laws, 
and therefore that Indiana and Wisconsin must to prevail establish a clearly 
                                                            
and the more conventional approach is semantic rather than substantive.  The 
conventional approach doesn’t purport to balance the costs and benefits of the 
challenged discriminatory law.”). 
 83.  Id. at 654 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 
(1993)). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 656. 
 87.  Id. at 665, 671. 
 88.  Id. at 654 (“We’ll see that the governments of Indiana and Wisconsin have 
given us no reason to think they have a ‘reasonable basis’ for forbidding same-sex 
marriage.”). 
 89.  Id. at 656-57. 
 90.  Id. at 654, 665. 
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offsetting governmental interest in that rejection.”91  In turn, the court 
deemed the only issue to be whether Indiana and Wisconsin had established 
such an offsetting interest.92 
The court focused solely on Indiana and Wisconsin’s arguments.93 
Indiana defended its same-sex marriage ban on one ground - its sole 
purpose in making marriage a legal relation is to “enhance child welfare.”94  
Indiana argued that the “[r]eason for its marriage law . . . is to try to 
channel unintentionally procreative sex into a legal regime in which the 
biological father is required to assume parental responsibility.95  The court 
did not accept Indiana’s argument for multiple reasons.96  But, ultimately, it 
was a matter of costs and benefits – Indiana could not show how 
prohibiting same-sex marriage served its interest in channeling 
unintentional procreative sex into marriage.97  Meanwhile, the costs that the 
same-sex marriage bans imposed on same-sex couples were, and are, 
considerable.98  Therefore, the court found that Indiana’s same-sex 
marriage ban had no rational relationship to Indiana’s interest in ensuring 
that children are supported.99 
Wisconsin defended its same-sex marriage ban on three main grounds.100  
The court invoked Loving v. Virginia to dispose of Wisconsin’s tradition 
argument and stated, “[i]f no social benefit is conferred by a tradition and it 
                                                            
 91.  Id. at 659. 
 92.  Id. (“Whether [Indiana and Wisconsin have established a clearly offsetting 
government interest] is really the only the only issue before us . . .”). 
 93.  Id. at 655 (“[o]ur main focus will be on the states’ arguments . . .”). 
 94.  Id. at 660. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 661 (“[i]f channeling procreative sex into marriage were the only reason 
that Indiana recognizes marriage, the state would not allow an infertile person to 
marry.”). 
 97.  Id. at 661-65 (positing that same-sex couples can actually alleviate the problem 
of accidental births through adoption and noting that the percentage of children born to 
unmarried women has actually risen since Indiana enacted its same-sex marriage ban – 
“[t]here is no indication that theses states’ laws, ostensibly aimed at channeling 
procreating into marriage, have had any such effect.”). 
 98.  Id. at 658 (discussing psychological harms imposed by same-sex marriage 
bans, such as: the denial of a coveted status (marriage) and the stigmatization of same-
sex couples inherent in the denial of their marriage rights and tangible harms, such as 
denial of important state benefits that are accorded to married couples). 
 99.  Id. at 665. 
 100.  Id. at 666. (illustrating (1) “[l]imiting marriage to heterosexuals is traditional 
and tradition is a valid basis for limiting legal rights”; (2) “[t]he consequences of 
allowing same-sex marriage cannot be foreseen and therefore a state should be 
permitted to move cautiously”; (3) “[t]he decision whether to permit or forbid same-sex 
marriage should be left to the democratic process.”).   
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is written into law and it discriminates against a number of people and does 
them harm beyond just offending them, it is not just a harmless 
anachronism; it is a violation of the equal protection clause . . . .”101  The 
court was also unconvinced by Wisconsin’s “go-slow” argument – i.e. the 
state needs time to act cautiously to address the same-sex marriage issue 
because allowing same-sex marriage would altogether transform traditional 
marriage and could result in unforeseen consequences – because Wisconsin 
simply could not show how heterosexual couples would be harmed by 
same-sex marriage.102  Last, the court dismissed Wisconsin’s political 
process argument by noting that same-sex couples represent a small 
percentage of the state’s population and thus have no real opportunity to 
invoke the political process in their favor.103  Therefore, the court held that 
Wisconsin’s same-sex marriage ban had no rational relationship to a 
legitimate interest of Wisconsin.104 
The court concluded its analysis by noting that “[m]ore than unsupported 
conjecture that same-sex marriage will harm heterosexual marriage or 
children, or any other valid and important state interest is necessary to 
justify discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”105  A state needs 
to show that there is some plausible benefit to prohibiting same-sex 
marriage that outweighs the costs imposed on same-sex couples.106  If the 
state cannot provide such an argument, then, according to the Seventh 
Circuit, the law prohibiting same-sex marriage does not even meet rational 
basis review and is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.107 
The Seventh Circuit likened its approach in Baskin to the Supreme 
Court’s approach in Windsor.108  In Windsor, the Court did not invoke a 
conventional form of heightened scrutiny to invalidate section 3 of DOMA 
and the Court balanced DOMA’s harms (costs) to gays and lesbians against 
its benefits.109  Although the Supreme Court did not invoke a conventional 
                                                            
 101.  Id. at 667. 
 102.  Id. at 668. 
 103.  Id. at 671. 
 104.  Id. (“As we have been at pains to explain, the grounds advanced by . . . 
Wisconsin for their discriminatory policies are not only conjectural; they are totally 
implausible.”). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See id. 
 107.  See id. at 656, 671. 
 108.  Id. at 671 (“For completeness we note the ultimate convergence of our 
simplified four-step analysis with the more familiar, but also more complex, approach 
found in many cases.”). 
 109.  However, courts interpreting the Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and 
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form of heightened scrutiny, “[n]otably absent from Windsor’s review of 
DOMA are the ‘strong presumption’ in favor of the constitutionality of 
laws and the ‘extremely deferential’ posture toward government action that 
are the marks of rational basis review . . . .”110 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit did not invoke conventional forms of 
heightened scrutiny to strike down Indiana and Wisconsin’s same-sex 
marriage bans – although it indicated that heightened scrutiny should apply 
to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.111  The Seventh 
Circuit weighed the costs same-sex marriage bans imposed on same-sex 
couples in Indiana and Wisconsin against the benefits of the laws to each 
respective state.112  Also, while the Seventh Circuit held that a heightened 
form was not necessary to invalidate Indiana and Wisconsin’s same sex 
marriage ban, the court did not follow the marks of conventional rational 
basis review – i.e. a strong presumption of validity and extreme deference 
toward government action.113 
B.  The Fourth Circuit – Bostic v. Schaefer 
Bostic v. Schaefer was filed in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia and is the main case challenging Virginia’s 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.114  The Plaintiffs in Bostic challenged 
the Marshall/Newman Amendment to the Virginia Constitution - which 
defines marriage as between a man and a woman and prohibits recognition 
of same-sex marriages performed in other states, Virginia Code Sections 
20-45.2 and 20-45.3, and “any other Virginia Law that bars same-sex 
marriage or prohibits the States recognition of otherwise lawful same-sex 
marriages from other jurisdictions.”115 
                                                            
Lawrence v. Texas have concluded that statutes that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation are subject to heightened scrutiny.  Id.  (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. 
v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471, 483 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 110.  Id. (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471, 
483 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 111.  Id. at 654, 656. 
 112.  Id. at 655-56. 
 113.  See e.g., id. at 660-65 (engaging in a comprehensive and grueling analysis of 
Indiana’s arguments regarding its interest in banning same-sex marriage). 
 114.  The case started in the Eastern District as Bostic v. Rainey.  Timothy Bostic 
and Tony London, an unmarried couple from Virginia, have been together since 1989.  
Carol Schall and Mary Townley, a married couple from Virginia, later joined as 
plaintiffs to the case.  Schall and Townley were married in California and want 
Virginia to recognize that marriage. 
 115.  Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 468 (E.D. Va. 2014); see also Justin 
Snow, Federal Court Rules Virginia Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, METRO 
WEEKLY (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.metroweekly.com/2014/02/federal-court-rules-
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The district court found Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.116  The district court enjoined 
Virginia’s employees, officers, and agents from enforcing any Virginia 
laws that prohibit same-sex marriage or same-sex marriage recognition.117  
The district court stayed the injunction pending appeal to the Fourth 
Circuit.118 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, with one justice 
dissenting.119  The court held that Virginia’s laws banning same-sex 
marriage were unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth amendment.120  Unlike the Seventh 
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis hinged on its holding that the 
fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage.121  
Overall, the Fourth Circuit engaged in a conventional due-process-
fundamental-right analysis.122 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis divided its analysis in two steps.123  First, 
the court determined what level of constitutional scrutiny to apply – either 
rational basis review or some form of heightened scrutiny.124  Second, the 
court determined whether Virginia’s laws banning same-sex marriage met 
the applicable level of scrutiny.125 
 1.  Applicable Level of Scrutiny 
At the outset, the court sought to determine whether Virginia’s same-sex 
marriage ban infringed on a fundamental right.126  Under both Due Process 
and Equal Protection, if a law infringes on a fundamental right, strict 
scrutiny applies.127  If the right at issue is not fundamental, then, typically, 
rational basis review applies.128 
                                                            
virginia-s/. 
 116.  Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d. at 484. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 120.  Id. at 384. 
 121.  Id. at 376. 
 122.  Id. at 375-77. 
 123.  Id. at 375. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See id. 
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The right to marry has long been established as a fundamental right.129  
In Bostic, both parties agreed that the right to marry is a fundamental 
right.130  However, both parties disagreed about whether the right to marry 
encompasses same-sex marriage.131  The Plaintiffs argued that the 
fundamental right to marry encompasses same-sex marriage.132  On the 
other hand, the Defendants argued that the right to marry does not 
encompass same-sex marriage because “[t]raditionally states have only 
sanctioned man-woman marriages.”133 
Ultimately, the court sided with the Plaintiffs, defined the right at issue 
as the right to marry - not the right to same-sex marriage, and held that the 
fundamental right to marry encompasses same-sex marriage.134 
The court found that the right to marry is not a static liberty interest and 
noted that, “[o]ver the decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that 
the right to marry is an expansive liberty interest that may stretch to 
accommodate changing societal norms.”135  Further, the court recognized 
that, in past cases involving the right to marry, the Supreme Court did not 
define the right with any greater specificity – e.g., in Loving v. Virginia, the 
Court did not define the right at issue as the right to interracial marriage.136  
Rather, cases like Loving, Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turner v. Safley, 
“[s]peak of a broad right to marry that is not circumscribed based on the 
characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that right.”137  In line 
with past Supreme Court decisions, the Fourth Circuit averred that the 
fundamental right to marry is included within the fundamental right to 
privacy, which protects the right to make basic life choices.138 
At the heart of the Fourth Circuit’s fundamental right analysis is a 
recurring theme forwarded by the Supreme Court – a majority of the Court 
is willing to protect a person’s freedom of choice in matters related to their 
personal relationships.139  In the Fourth Circuit’s view, the Supreme 
                                                            
 129.  Id.  (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 485-86 (1965) Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190, 205 (1888)). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 375. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See id. at 375-77. 
 135.  Id. at 376. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 376-77. 
 139.  Arguably, this theme began in Griswold v. Connecticut.  But it was best 
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Court’s protection of private, personal choices carried through to Lawrence 
v. Texas – where the Court “refused to narrowly define the right at issue as 
the right of ‘homosexuals to engage in sodomy,’ [and concluded] that 
doing so would constitute a failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at 
stake.”140  The Fourth Circuit’s view also carried recently in United States 
v. Windsor – where the Court found that “section 3 of DOMA was 
unconstitutional, in part, on that provision’s disrespect for the ‘moral and 
sexual choices’ that accompany a same-sex couples’ decision to marry.”141  
The Fourth Circuit used this recurring theme, and its presence in Lawrence 
and Windsor to conclude that, although cases like Loving, Zablocki, and 
Turner involved opposite sex couples, the Supreme Court “[w]ould grant 
the same level of constitutional protection to the choice to marry a person 
of the same sex.”142  In turn, the Fourth Circuit held that strict scrutiny 
applied to Virginia’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.143 
2.  Is the Level of Scrutiny Met? 
First, the court laid out the standards for strict scrutiny, “under strict 
scrutiny, a law ‘may be justified only by compelling state interests, and 
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.’”144  Further, the 
court noted that the Defendants have the burden of proving that the 
challenged Virginia laws meet the strict scrutiny standard.145  The 
Defendants forwarded five “compelling interests” behind the Virginia laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage: “(1) Virginia’s federalism-based interest in 
maintaining control over the definition of marriage within its borders, (2) 
the history and tradition of opposite-sex marriage, (3) protecting the 
institution of marriage, (4) encouraging responsible procreation, and (5) 
promoting the optimal child rearing environment.”146 
The court invoked Windsor to dispose of the Defendants’ federalism 
                                                            
articulated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, when the Supreme Court stated that liberty 
includes “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”  Id. at 375-77 (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) and discussing Supreme 
Court precedent that involves protection of a person’s freedom of choice in private, 
personal matters). 
 140.  Id. at 377 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003)). 
 141.  Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)). 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l 421 U.S. 678, 686 (1977)). 
 145.  Id. (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013)). 
 146.  Id. at 378. 
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argument.147  First, the court recognized that in Windsor the Supreme Court 
“emphasized states’ traditional authority over marriage.”148  But noted that 
the Supreme Court also made clear that “state laws defining and regulating 
marriage . . . must respect the constitutional rights of persons.”149  
Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, “Windsor does not teach us that 
federalism principles can justify depriving individuals of their 
constitutional rights.”150  In turn, the court held that “Virginia’s federalism-
based interest in defining marriage . . . cannot justify its encroachment on 
the fundamental right to marry.”151 
The court quickly dismantled the Defendant’s history and tradition 
argument.  The court looked to Supreme Court precedent and noted that 
“the Supreme Court has made it clear that, even under rational basis 
review, the “[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give it immunity 
from attack.”152  Therefore, the court held that the history and tradition of 
man-woman marriages is not a compelling state interest that justifies 
Virginia’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.153 
The court was not persuaded by the Defendant’s contention that allowing 
same-sex marriage would somehow change the institution of marriage or 
discourage responsible procreation.154  First, the Defendant’s argued that 
allowing same-sex marriage would “[s]ever the link between marriage and 
procreation.”155  The court simply reiterated that, according to the Supreme 
Court, marriage is a unity that extends beyond procreation.156  Next, the 
Defendant’s reiterated another familiar argument: Virginia sanctions 
heterosexual marriage to provide stability to the types of relationships that 
result in unintended pregnancies.157  The court dismissed this argument by 
noting that “[i]f Virginia sought to ensure responsible procreation via [laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage], the laws are woefully underinclusive.”158  
This is because same-sex couples are not the only group of couples “who 
cannot reproduce accidentally” – e.g. infertile opposite-couples cannot 
                                                            
 147.  Id. at 378-79. 
 148.  Id. at 378-79 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 
(2013)). 
 149.  Id. at 379 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 380 (quoting Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993)). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 380-83. 
 155.  Id. at 380. 
 156.  Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 485-86 (1965)). 
 157.  Id. at 381. 
 158.  Id. 
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reproduce accidently.159  Moreover, the court resisted the Defendant’s 
attempt to distinguish infertile couples from same-sex couples because 
infertile couples and same-sex couples are similarly situated and thus “[t]he 
Equal Protection Clause counsels against treating [them] differently.”160 
Last, the court disposed of the state’s argument that opposite-sex couples 
are better suited for childrearing.161  The court found that the Defendant’s 
argument failed “for at least two . . . reasons.”162  First, “[u]nder heightened 
scrutiny, states cannot support a law using ‘overbroad generalizations about 
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of’ the groups in 
question.”163  Second, the court reiterated that strict scrutiny requires 
congruity between a law’s means and its ends.164  Further, the court found 
no congruity between Virginia’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and 
optimal childrearing.165  Thus, the court held that optimal childrearing is 
not a compelling interest furthered by same-sex marriage bans.166 
Therefore, strict scrutiny was not met because the court found that the 
state did not establish a compelling state interest behind its laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.167  In turn, the court held that Virginia’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.168 
3.  Judge Niemeyer’s Dissent 
In Judge Niemeyer’s view, the majority’s analysis was fundamentally 
flawed.169  He would not hold that the fundamental right to marry 
encompasses same-sex marriage because “[t]he ‘marriage’ that has long 
been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right is distinct 
from the newly proposed relationship of a same-sex marriage.”170  
Therefore, Judge Niemeyer would apply rational basis review to Virginia’s 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.171 
                                                            
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 383-84. 
 162.  Id. at 384. 
 163.  Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996)). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 386 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id. at 393 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
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According to Judge Niemeyer, the Virginia’s aforementioned arguments 
in favor of its laws prohibiting same-sex marriage satisfy the rational basis 
requirement.172  Likewise, “[b]ecause there is no fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage and there are rational reasons for not recognizing it, just 
as there are rational reasons for recognizing it,” Judge Niemeyer would 
uphold Virginia’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.173 
B.  The Ninth Circuit – Latta v. Otter & Sevcik v. Sandoval 
Latta v. Otter was filed in the United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho and is the main case challenging Idaho’s laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage.174  The Plaintiffs in Latta challenged Article III, § 28 of the 
Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code sections 32-201 and 32-209, and “[a]ny 
other [Idaho] laws or regulations to the extent they do not recognize same-
sex marriages validly contracted outside Idaho or prohibit otherwise 
qualified same-sex couples from marrying in Idaho.”175  The district court 
found Idaho’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.176  The district court permanently enjoined Idaho 
and “[i]ts officers, employees, agents and political subdivisions from 
enforcing . . .” Idaho’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.177  
Subsequently the Defendants appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Sevcik v. Sandoval, filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada, is the main case challenging Nevada’s laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.178  The Plaintiffs in Sevcik challenged Nevada’s laws 
precluding same-sex marriage and prohibiting the recognition of otherwise 
                                                            
 172.  Id. at 398 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d. 1054, 1062-63 (D. Idaho 2014). 
 175.  A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that 
shall be valid or recognized in this state. IDAHO CONST. ART. III § 28. Idaho Code 
section 32-201 says that a marriage is between a man and a woman. See IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 32-201 (2014).  Idaho Code section 32-209 states that Idaho does not recognize 
lawful same-sex marriages performed in another state.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 
(2014).  The Plaintiffs in Latta include: Susan Latta and Traci Ehlers, a married couple 
from Idaho that has been together since 2003; Lori Watsen and Sharene Watsen, a 
married couple from Idaho that has been together since 2009; Shelia Robertson and 
Andrea Altmayer, an unmarried couple that has been together for 16 years; and Amber 
Beierle and Rachael Robertson, an unmarried couple that has been together since 2010.  
Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d. at 1062-64, 1087. 
 176.  Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d. at 1087. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d. 996, 997 (D. Nev. 2012). 
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valid same sex marriages performed in other states.179  The district court 
applied rational basis review and upheld Nevada’s laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage.180  Subsequently, the Plaintiffs appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Latta v. Otter and Sevcik v. Sandoval were consolidated for purposes of 
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision in Latta v. Otter and held that Idaho’s laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage were unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.181  The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision in Sevcik v. Sandoval and held that Nevada’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.182 
The Ninth Circuit was in familiar territory when it heard Latta v. Otter.  
The court had already considered the effects of United States v. Windsor a 
few months prior to Latta in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.183  
In SmithKline, the Ninth Circuit held that “[W]indsor established a level of 
scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation that is 
unquestionably higher than rational basis review.”184  In the Ninth Circuit’s 
view, “[W]indsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal 
protection claims involving sexual orientation.”185  Therefore, in Latta, the 
court applied “heightened scrutiny” to Idaho and Nevada’s laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.186 
The Ninth Circuit applied heightened scrutiny in Latta but, like the 
Seventh Circuit in Baskin and the Supreme Court in Windsor, the court did 
not apply a conventional form of heightened scrutiny – such as 
intermediate or strict.187  According to the Ninth Circuit, “[l]aws that treat 
people differently based on sexual orientation are unconstitutional unless a 
‘legitimate purpose . . . overcome[s]’ the injury inflicted by the law on 
lesbians and gays and their families.188  That sounds similar to rational 
                                                            
 179.  Id. at 998.  
 180.  Id. at 997.  See also Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 181.  Latta, 771 F.3d at 476. 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id. at 468 (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 
474 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 184.  Id. (quoting SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481). 
 185.  Id. (quoting SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481). 
 186.  Id. (“Because Idaho and Nevada’s laws discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation . . .” heightened scrutiny is applied). 
 187.  See id. at 468 (stating that heightened scrutiny is applicable but not indicating 
that a conventional form of heightened, such as intermediate or strict is applicable). 
 188.  Id. at 476 (quoting SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 481-82). 
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basis review but, like the Supreme Court in Windsor, the court “[d]eclined 
to adopt the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality and the heavy 
deference to legislative judgments characteristic of rational basis 
review.”189  In turn, because the court invoked Windsor-esque heightened 
scrutiny, the Defendants bore the burden of proving that Idaho’s marriage 
laws should survive constitutional review.190 
The Defendants’ main contention is that “their marriage laws survive 
heightened scrutiny because they promote child welfare by encouraging 
optimal parenting.”191  Per usual, the Defendants’ argument was two 
pronged.192  First, they made a “procreative channeling argument” – i.e. 
“[m]arriage is important because, [in the event of unintended pregnancies], 
it serves to bind [heterosexual] couples together and to their children.”193  
The court dismissed the Defendants’ procreative channeling argument by 
first concluding that “marriage supports same-sex couples in parenting their 
children, just as it does opposite-sex couples.”194  Next, the court noted 
that, in line with Griswold, marriage is not just about procreation.195  Last, 
like the Seventh Circuit, the court found that “[I]daho and Nevada’s laws 
are grossly over-and under-inclusive with respect to procreative 
capacity.”196  This is because - like Indiana and Virginia - Idaho and 
Nevada “[g]ive marriage licenses to many opposite-sex couples who cannot 
or will not reproduce” – e.g. sterile and elderly couples.197 
Second, like Virginia in Bostic, some of the Defendants in Latta argued 
that opposite-sex couples are better suited for child rearing.198  The court 
quickly disposed of this argument.  First, the court noted that “Windsor 
‘forbids state action from denoting the inferiority’ of same sex couples.”199  
                                                            
 189.  Francis Amendola, J.D. ET AL., 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1120 (2014) 
(“Rational basis standard . . . requires only that the classification rationally or 
reasonably further a legitimate governmental purpose.”); Latta, 771 F.3d at 468. 
 190.  Latta, 771 F.3d at 468 (stating that “[d]efendants argue that their marriage 
laws survive heightened scrutiny because they promote child welfare by encouraging 
optimal parenting,” which indicates that the defendants had the burden). 
 191.  Id. at 468, 476 (“Defendant’s essential contention is that bans on same-sex 
marriage promote the welfare of children . . . .”). 
 192.  Id. at 468. 
 193.  Id. at 464, 468, 471. 
 194.  Id. at 471. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 472. 
 197.  Id. see supra note 96 (positing that Indiana allows infertile couples to marry). 
 198.  Id. at 473. 
 199.  Id. (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 482 
(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)). 
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Likewise, the court stated that “[W]indsor makes clear that the defendants’ 
explicit desire to express a preference for opposite-sex couples over same-
sex couples is categorically inadequate justification for discrimination.”200 
The Defendants forwarded a few additional arguments that the court was 
wholly unresponsive to, but briefly considered – such as federalism, 
religious liberty, and protecting the traditional institution of marriage.201 
Overall, the court found that the Defendants’ arguments amounted to 
nothing more than speculation and conclusory assertions.202  According to 
the court, “heightened scrutiny . . . demands more than speculation and 
conclusory assertions, especially when the assertions are of such little 
merit.203  Likewise, the court found that the Defendants did not establish a 
legitimate purpose behind its marriage laws that overcame the harm done to 
same-sex couples and their families.204  Thus, the court held that 
“heightened scrutiny” was not met.205  In turn, the court held that Idaho and 
Nevada’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional as a 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.206 
Judge Reinhardt, in addition to writing for the majority, wrote a separate 
concurrence.207  In Judge Reinhardt’s view, like the Fourth Circuit held in 
Bostic, “[t]he fundamental right to marriage, repeatedly recognized by the 
Supreme Court, in cases such as Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, is properly 
understood as including . . .” the right to same-sex marriage.208  Therefore, 
in addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause, Judge Reinhardt would 
find Idaho and Nevada’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.209 
Although Judge Berzon joined in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, she also 
wrote a separate concurrence.210  In Judge Berzon’s view, Idaho and 
Nevada’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional because 
“[t]hey are classifications on the basis of gender that do not survive the 
                                                            
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 474-76. 
 202.  Id. at 476. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 477 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 479 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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level of scrutiny applicable to such classifications.”211 
Classifications made on the basis of gender are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.212  Meaning that, to withstand intermediate scrutiny, Idaho and 
Nevada’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage must “[s]erve important 
governmental objectives and [be] substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.”213  Like Windsor-esque heightened scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny places the “burden of justification” on the state.214  And, according 
to Judge Berzon, neither Idaho nor Nevada’s arguments saved Idaho or 
Nevada’s same-sex marriage prohibition from intermediate scrutiny.215  
Therefore, in addition to holding Idaho and Nevada’s same-sex marriage 
bans unconstitutional through an equal protection analysis guided by 
Windsor, Judge Berzon would have held the Idaho and Nevada laws 
unconstitutional through a more conventional equal protection analysis.216 
C.  The Tenth Circuit – Kitchen v. Herbert 
Kitchen v. Herbert was filed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah and is the main case challenging Utah’s same-sex marriage 
ban.217  The Plaintiffs in Kitchen challenged Utah Code § 30-1-2(5), Utah 
Code § 30-1-4.1, and Utah Const. art. I § 29.218 
The district court found Utah’s laws prohibiting and precluding same-sex 
marriage unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.219  In turn, the court 
enjoined Utah from “[e]nforcing Sections 30-1-2 and 30-1-4.1 of the Utah 
Code and Article I, § 29 of the Utah Constitution to the extent [those] laws 
                                                            
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. at 479-80. 
 213.  Id. at 490 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
 214.  Id. at 480. 
 215.  Id. at 495. 
 216.  Id. at 495-96. 
 217.  The Plaintiffs in Kitchen include: Derek Kitchen and Moudi Sbeity – Utah 
residents that have been in a committed relationship for many years; Laurie Wood and 
Kody Partridge – Utah residents in a committed relationship “[w]ho wish to confirm 
their life commitment and love through marriage”; and Karen Archer and Kate Call – 
Utah residents who were lawfully married in Iowa and demand that Utah recognize 
their marriage.  Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 218.  Utah Code § 30-1-2(5) says that marriages between persons of the same-sex 
are prohibited and void; Utah Code § 30-1-4.1 says that Utah only recognizes legal 
unions between a man and woman and that it will not recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in other states; Utah Const. art. I § 29 says that marriage is between a man 
and a woman and that Utah will not recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 
states. Id. at 1200. 
 219.  Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1216. 
36
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol24/iss1/1
HARRISON 10/1/15 (DO NOT DELETE)  
2015] AT LONG LAST MARRIAGE 37 
prohibit [same-sex marriage].”220  Subsequently, the Defendants appealed 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, with one justice 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.221  The court held that Utah’s laws 
banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional as a violation of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth amendment.222  
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis hinged on its holding 
that the fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex 
marriage.223  Overall, the Tenth Circuit engaged in a conventional due-
process-fundamental-right analysis.224 
The court quickly established that the right to marry is a fundamental 
right and noted that the Supreme Court has long recognized that marriage is 
“the most important relation in life.”225  The court disregarded the 
Defendant’s urges and, like the Fourth Circuit, refused to hold that only 
opposite-sex marriage is a fundamental right.226  The court stated that “[t]he 
right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals . . .” and 
recognized that the Supreme Court has refused to define the right based on 
the characteristics of the person asserting it.227 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the court allowed the Supreme Court’s 
protection of privacy and personal autonomy, present in cases like 
Lawrence and Windsor, to frame its analysis.228  The court highlighted the 
importance of a person’s freedom of choice in matters related to their 
personal relationships – especially in the context of marriage.229  The court 
recognized that marriage and procreation are sometimes considered 
together, but it did not allow that notion to control its analysis.230  Instead, 
the court gave great weight to the “personal elements inherent in the 
                                                            
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 1230. 
 222.  Id. at 1229-30. 
 223.  Id. at 1218. 
 224.  Id. at 1209-18. 
 225.  Id. at 1209 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)). 
 226.  Id. at 1209-10. See also supra, note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Fourth Circuit’s refusal to define the right at issue as the right to same-sex marriage).  
 227.  Id. at 1209 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)). 
 228.  Id. at 1214, 1217 (discussing the effects of Lawrence and Windsor on its 
analysis). 
 229.  Id. at 1211-13. 
 230.  Id. at 1210-11 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 
541 (1942) (“Marriage and procreating are fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.”)). 
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institution of marriage,” rather than the ability to procreate.231  And the 
court noted that defining the right at issue as the right to same-sex marriage 
would “[fail] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake . . . .”232  
Likewise, the court concluded that the “[p]laintiffs possess[ed] a 
fundamental right to marry and to have their marriages recognized.”233 
The court applied strict scrutiny to Utah’s laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage because the court held that such laws infringed upon the 
Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marriage.234  The court analyzed whether 
Utah’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were “[n]arrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest . . .” in order to determine whether strict 
scrutiny was met.235 
The Defendant’s argued that Utah’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage 
forwarded the state’s interest in: “(1) ‘fostering a child-centric marriage 
culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own interest to the 
needs of their children’; (2) ‘children being raised by their biologically 
mothers and fathers – or at least by a married mother and father – in a 
stable home’; (3) ‘ensuring adequate reproduction’; and (4) 
‘accommodating religious freedom and reducing the potential for civic 
strife.’”236 
The court assumed the Defendant’s first three justifications for Utah’s 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were compelling.237  The court found, 
however, that those justifications did not meet “[t]he means prong of the 
strict scrutiny test . . . .”238  In other words, the court found that Utah’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage were not necessary to achieve any of the 
Defendant’s first three justifications.239 
Overall, the court found that Utah’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage 
were not “narrowly tailored” because they were vastly under-inclusive.240  
The court stated that Defendant’s first three justifications all rested on the 
notion that “[a]llowing same-sex couples to marry would break the critical 
conceptual link between marriage and procreating.”241  However, the court 
                                                            
 231.  Id. at 1212. 
 232.  Id. at 1217 (citing Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)). 
 233.  Id. at 1218. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 1219. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id.  
 239.  See id.  
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id.  
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noted that Utah allows “[m]any other types of non-procreative couples to 
wed” and recognized that “[s]uch a mismatch between the class identified 
by a challenged law and the characteristic allegedly relevant to the state’s 
interest is precisely the type of imprecisions prohibited by heightened 
scrutiny.”242  Second, the court dismissed the Defendant’s procreative 
channeling argument.243  The court “agreed with the numerous cases 
decided since Windsor,” which indicate “[t]hat it is wholly illogical to 
believe that state recognition of the love and commitment between same-
sex couples will alter the most intimate and personal decisions of opposite-
sex couples.”244  Quite simply, like many other courts, the Tenth Circuit 
found that allowing same-sex marriage has nothing to do with how 
opposite-sex raise their children.245  Third, the court disagreed with the 
contention that opposite-sex parents are better suited for parenting.246  The 
court found that “[a] prohibition on same-sex marriage is not narrowly 
tailored toward the goal of encouraging gendered parenting styles . . .” 
because, among other things, Utah did not “[r]estrict the right to marry . . . 
based on compliance with any set of parenting roles, or even parenting 
quality.”247  Last, the court quickly dismissed Defendant’s fourth 
justification because “[e]ven assuming that appellants are correct in 
predicting that some substantial degree of discord will follow state 
recognition of same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that public opposition cannot provide cover for a violation of fundamental 
rights.”248 
Judge Kelly concurred with the majority’s view that the Plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge Utah’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.249  
However, Judge Kelly would have dismissed the Plaintiffs’ case - without 
reaching the merits – for lack of substantial federal question pursuant to 
Baker v. Nelson.250  In Baker, “the [Supreme Court] dismissed an appeal 
asking whether the Constitution forces a state to recognize same-gender 
marriage ‘for want of substantial federal question.’”251 In Judge Kelly’s 
view, Baker is binding precedent that lower federal courts must follow.252  
                                                            
 242.  Id. at 1219-20. 
 243.  Id. at 1223-24. 
 244.  Id. at 1223. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 1224-25. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Id. at 1227. 
 249.  Id. at 1230 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 250.  Id. at 1231-32. 
 251.  Id. at 1231 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)). 
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Unlike his colleagues on the Tenth Circuit – and the Seventh, Fourth, and 
Ninth circuits – Judge Kelly did not believe that subsequent doctrinal 
developments had rendered Baker inapplicable.253 
Regardless, Judge Kelly considered the merits of Kitchen and disagreed 
with the majority’s holding that Utah’s same-sex marriage ban infringed on 
the Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marriage.254  According to Judge Kelly, 
there is no fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
that “[r]equires Utah to extend marriage to same-gender couples and 
recognize same-gender marriages from other states.”255  In turn, Judge 
Kelly would not apply heightened scrutiny and would uphold Utah’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage as “[r]ationally related to (1) responsible 
procreating, (2) effective parenting, and (3) the desire to proceed cautiously 
in this evolving area.”256 
D.  The Sixth Circuit – DeBoer v. Snyder 
DeBoer was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan and is the main case challenging Michigan’s laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.257  For purposes of appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
combined DeBoer with other cases challenging same-sex marriage from 
districts within the Sixth Circuit.258  The United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan - as well as the Southern District of Ohio, 
                                                            
 252.  Id. (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (“A summary 
dismissal is a merits determination and a lower federal court should not come to an 
opposite conclusion on the issues presented.”). 
 253.  Id. at 1232.  Contra id. at 1204-06 (positing that Lawrence and Windsor 
“[u]ndermine[] the notion that the question presented in Baker is insubstantial); Baskin 
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that Baker is no longer 
authoritative); Bostic v. Schaefer 760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (declining to 
recognize the view in Baker as binding precedent); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 467 
(9th Cir. 2014) (stating that Baker no longer precludes review). 
 254.  Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1230 (Kelly, J. dissenting). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  The Plaintiffs challenged the Michigan Marriage Amendment, which states: 
“To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future 
generations of children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the 
only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.”  DeBoer v. 
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 759 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (quoting MICH. CONST. ART. I, § 
25).  April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse – an unmarried same-sex couple residing in 
Michigan – were the Plaintiffs in DeBoer. DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 759. 
 258.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 397-99 (6th Cir. 2014).  Those cases 
included: Bourke v. Beshear – from the Western District of Kentucky; Tanco v. Haslem 
– from the Middle District of Tennessee; Obergefell v. Wymyslo – from the Southern 
District of Ohio; and Henry v. Himes – also from the Southern District of Ohio. 
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the Middle District of Tennessee, and the Western District of Kentucky, 
ruled that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional as 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.259 
The Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, disagreed with the district courts and 
upheld Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky’s laws prohibiting – and/
or precluding the recognition of – same-sex marriage as constitutional.260 
The majority allowed its views of judicial activism to frame its 
analysis.261  Overarching the majority’s constitutional analysis is the view 
that the people of each respective state, not a federal court applying the 
federal constitution, should decide the same-sex marriage issue.262  
Whether this line of thinking is correct is another issue, but it undoubtedly 
factored into the court’s constitutional analysis of the legal question 
presented: whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits a State from defining marriage as a relationship 
between one man and one woman.263  In the Sixth Circuit’s view, it only 
had power to decide this straightforward, yet loaded, question.264  The 
majority starkly repudiated its ability to resolve the question of whether gay 
marriage is a “good idea,” or the right thing to do.265 
                                                            
 259.  DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (holding Michigan’s laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1062 (S.D. Ohio 2014) 
(holding Ohio’s laws precluding the recognition of valid same-sex marriages from 
other states unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Tanco v. Haslem, 7 F. Supp. 3d. 759, 769 
(M.D. Tenn. 2014) (holding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on merits of equal 
protection claim and granting Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, which 
enjoined Tennessee from enforcing its laws precluding the recognition of valid same-
sex marriages); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding 
Kentucky’s laws precluding the recognition of valid same-sex marriages 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F Supp. 2d 968, 1000 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(holding Ohio’s laws precluding the recognition of valid same-sex marriages from 
other states unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 260.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 261.  See id. at 396 (“Of all the ways to resolve this question, one option is not 
available: a poll of the three judges on this panel, or for that matter all federal judges, 
about whether gay marriage is a good idea.”).  See also Lyle Denniston, Sixth Circuit: 
Now, A Split on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2014, 4:50pm), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/sixth-circuit-the-split-on-same-sex-marriage/ 
(detailing the majority’s approach). 
 262.  See DeBoer, 722 F.3d at 396. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Id. 
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The Sixth Circuit’s analysis started in the same place as every other 
circuit to consider the same-sex marriage issue – Baker v. Nelson.266  The 
Sixth Circuit, however, viewed Baker quite differently than the Fourth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.267  The majority found that Baker – a 
one-sentence summary dismissal, rendered by the Supreme Court in 1972, 
of a case challenging Minnesota’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage for 
“want of substantial federal question” – was still binding precedent.268  In 
the majority’s view, neither the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, 
Romer v. Evans, or Windsor represented subsequent doctrinal 
developments sufficient as grounds for not following Baker.269  Therefore, 
in applying Baker, the majority would have dismissed DeBoer without 
reaching the merits.270 
Nonetheless, the majority turned to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claim in 
DeBoer.271  To determine whether same-sex marriage was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority looked to the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and our nation’s history and tradition.272  The court 
stated, “[a]ll Justices, past and present, start their assessment of a case 
about the meaning of a constitutional provision by looking at how the 
provision was understood by the people who ratified it.”273  The majority 
found that “[n]obody . . . argue[d] that the people who adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood it to require the States to change the 
definition of marriage.”274  The majority cited a myriad of Supreme Court 
cases that applied the original meaning approach - ranging from Marbury v. 
Madison to NLRB v. Noel Canning - in order to support its analysis and 
concluded that the original meaning approach “[p]ermits today’s marriage 
laws to stand until the democratic processes say they should stand no 
more.”275 
                                                            
 266.  Id. at 399-400. 
 267.  Compare id. at 400-02 (stating that Baker is still binding Supreme Court 
precedent), with Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373-75 (4th Cir. 2014) (declining to 
view Baker as binding Supreme Court precedent), and Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 
659-60 (7th Cir. 2014) (declining to view Baker as binding Supreme Court precedent), 
and Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 466-67 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to view Baker as 
binding Supreme Court precedent), and Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1205-06 
(10th Cir. 2014 (declining to view Baker as binding Supreme Court precedent). 
 268.  See DeBoer, 722 F.3d  at 430. 
 269.  Id. at 401-02. 
 270.  See id. at 401. 
 271.  Id. at 402-03. 
 272.  Id. at 403-04. 
 273.  Id. at 403. 
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. at 403-04. 
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Beyond its vast deference to political process, the majority refused to 
recognize the fundamental right to marriage as including the right to same-
sex marriage and apply heightened scrutiny to the State laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage.276  The majority stated that, in order for the right to 
same-sex marriage to be considered a fundamental right, it “[m]ust turn on 
bedrock assumptions about liberty.”277  The majority quickly dismissed this 
as implausible because “[t]he first state high court to redefine marriage to 
include gay couples did not do so until 2003.”278  Next, the majority noted 
that “matters do not change because Loving held that ‘marriage’ amounts to 
a fundamental right.”279  In the majority’s view, implicit in the Loving 
Court’s holding was the notion that “marriage” means only marriage 
between a man and a woman.280 
Similarly, the majority refused to apply heightened scrutiny to the State 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage in the context of the Plaintiffs’ Equal 
Protection claim.281  The majority recognized that Supreme Court cases 
“call[] for heightened review of laws that target groups whom legislators 
have singled out for unequal treatment in the past.”282  Unlike the Ninth 
Circuit, however, Sixth Circuit precedent counseled the majority to apply 
rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications.283  Further, the 
majority found that Supreme Court precedent counseled against applying 
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications because the Court 
“has never held that legislative classifications based on sexual orientation 
receive heightened review and . . . has not recognized a new suspect class 
in more than four decades.”284  Moreover, the majority admitted “[t]he 
lamentable reality that gay individuals have experienced prejudice in this 
country . . . .”285  But, ultimately, found that discrimination against gay 
individuals and the traditional definition of marriage were unrelated 
because “[t]he institution of marriage arose independently of [such] 
discrimination.”286 
In turn, the majority applied rational basis review to the State laws 
                                                            
 276.  See id. at 410-13. 
 277.  Id. at 411. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. at 413. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  See id. 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
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prohibiting same-sex marriage.287  The majority applied traditional rational 
basis review - rather than a more demanding form like that found in 
Windsor or Baskin - which is extremely deferential to the government.288  
The majority noted that rational basis review is met “[s]o long as judges 
can conceive of some ‘plausible’ reason for the law – any plausible reason, 
even one that did not motivate the legislators who enacted it – the law must 
stand, not matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the judges may consider it 
as citizens.”289 
At the outset, the majority made its position relatively obvious and 
stated, “a dose of humility makes us hesitant to condemn as 
unconstitutionally irrational a view of marriage shared not long ago by 
every society in the world, shared by most, if not all, our ancestors, and 
shared still today by a significant numbers of states.”290  The majority made 
clear, however, that it would need some rational basis to uphold as 
constitutional the State laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.291 
The majority found that there were at least two rational reasons for the 
State laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.292  First, the majority found that 
procreative channeling was a rational reason for the State same-sex 
marriage bans.293  The court stated, “[o]ne can well appreciate why the 
citizenry would think that a reasonable first concern of any society is the 
need to regulate male-female relationships and the unique procreative 
possibilities of them.”294  Further, the majority posited that by creating a 
status (marriage) and by subsidizing it (e.g., with tax-filing privileges and 
deductions), the States created an incentive for two people who procreate 
together to stay together for purpose of rearing offspring.”295  The majority 
then pointed out the obvious – same-sex couples cannot procreate and thus 
do not serve the state’s policy goals in this area.296  In turn, the majority 
found that the state’s interest in procreative channeling was a rational 
reason for defining marriage as between a man and woman.297  Second, the 
majority found that [a]nother rational explanation for the decision of many 
States not to expand the definition of marriage . . .” is to “[w]ait and see 
                                                            
 287.  See id. at 404. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id.  
 293.  See id. at 404-06. 
 294.  Id. at 405. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at 404-05. 
 297.  See id. at 405-06. 
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before changing a norm that our society . . . has accepted for centuries.”298 
Therefore, because it found a rational basis for the traditional definition 
of marriage, the majority upheld the State laws prohibiting – and/or 
precluding the recognition of – same-sex marriage.299 
Judge Daughtrey authored a vehement dissent to the majority’s 
opinion.300  She would have upheld the district court’s ruling that state laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage are unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.301  Judge Daughtrey fundamentally disagreed with 
the majority’s constitutional analysis of state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.302  In her mind, given the district court’s analysis and the 
opinions of the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, no thorough 
analysis would have been necessary to uphold the district court’s decision 
and rule that state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are 
unconstitutional.303 
Nonetheless, Judge Daughtrey briefly discussed how she would go about 
invalidating same-sex marriage bans.304  First, she would give no effect to 
Baker v. Nelson.305  In her mind, cases such as Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, 
Kitchen, Bostic, and Baskin represent the Supreme Court’s tacit overruling 
of Baker.306  And, at the very least, she notes that these cases represent 
subsequent doctrinal developments sufficient to render Baker ineffective.307  
Further, Judge Daughtrey would find that same-sex marriage bans violate 
equal protection because they are a form of unconstitutional animus.308  
Specifically, she would apply Justice Stevens’ articulation of equal 
protection analysis from his concurrence in City of Cleburne and hold that 
same-sex marriage bans have no rational basis.309 
                                                            
 298.  Id. at 406. 
 299.  Id. at 407, 421. 
 300.  See id. at 421 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  See id. at 421-22. 
 303.  Id. at 428. 
 304.  See id. at 430-37. 
 305.  Id. at 430-31. 
 306.  See id. at 431. 
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 435-36. 
 309.  Id. at 436 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In every equal protection case, we have to ask 
certain basic questions, What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been 
subjected to a ‘tradition of disfavor by our laws’? What is the public purpose that I 
being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged class that 
justifies the disparate treatment? In most cases the answer to these questions will tell us 
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As demonstrated above, with the exception of the Sixth Circuit in 
DeBoer, Courts of Appeals addressing the constitutionality of state bans on 
same sex marriage post-Windsor applied Justice Kennedy’s analysis in 
Windsor employing three basic analytical methodologies: 
Marriage is a fundamental right that can only be infringed upon by a 
showing of a compelling state interest.310 
Windsor calls for an equal protection analysis with a degree of 
heightened scrutiny in cases where the regulation is rooted in majoritarian 
morality of animus, assuming that such regulations begin with a taint of 
irrationality.311 
Windsor calls for an unconventional equal protection rational basis 
analysis that rejects deference to the state’s rationale for bans on same sex 
marriage and focuses on whether the costs imposed on gay couples by 
these bans outweigh benefits of those laws that are proven by the state. 312 
On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the cases 
emanating from the Sixth Circuit discussed above.313  The Court granted 
certiorari to answer the following questions: 
1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage 
between two people of the same sex? 
2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a 
marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was 
lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?314 
What is quite striking is that the only Court of Appeals to uphold bans on 
same sex marriage, the Sixth Circuit, did so by relying on Baker v. Nelson 
– a 1972 one-sentence summary dismissal of a case challenging 
Minnesota’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage for “want of substantial 
federal question.”315  Contrary to virtually every court that addressed the 
issue post-Windsor, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Baker was still binding 
precedent remaining unchanged despite the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Romer, Lawrence, or Windsor.316  Having explored the development of the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of the fundamental right to marry,317 the 
                                                            
whether the statute has a ‘rational basis.’”). 
 310.  See discussion supra Part III-B & D. 
 311.  See discussion supra Part III-C. 
 312.  See discussion supra Part III-A. 
	   313.  Denniston, Court Will Rule on Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 10, at 1. 
 314.  Id.  
 315.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014).  See generally, contra, 
Andrew Janet, Note, Eat, Drink, and Marry: Why Baker v. Nelson should have No 
Impact on Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1777 (2014). 
 316.  DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 401-02. 
 317.  See discussion supra Part V-A. 
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development by Justice Kennedy in the Romer / Lawrence / Windsor 
trilogy of a jurisprudential analysis focused on the fundamental concepts of 
liberty, dignity, and equality,318 and the application of that jurisprudence to 
the constitutionality of state efforts to ban same sex marriage by the Courts 
of Appeals.319  This Article now turns to an analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell, looking first at the historical development 
of the Supreme Court’s marriage jurisprudence and then at the decision 
itself.  The conclusion of this Article then identifies the legal issues that 
will necessarily arise from the Supreme Court’s decision finding state bans 
on same sex marriage unconstitutional. 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS – OBERGEFELL V. HODGES320 
A.  The Development of a Marriage Jurisprudence by the Supreme Court321 
 
The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood 
in isolation from developments in law and society.  The history of 
marriage is one of both continuity and change.  That institution—even as 
confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time. . . . These 
new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution of 
marriage.  Indeed, changed understandings of marriage are characteristic 
of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new 
generations, often through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests 
and then are considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.322 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear, time and again, that marriage is one 
of the most significant and fundamental rights provided protection under 
the Constitution.323  This understanding formed the foundation for the 
majority opinion in Obergefell.324  In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice 
Douglas characterized marriage as a “coming together for better or for 
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the [point] of being sacred[,]” 
describing it as “an association that promotes a way of life . . . a harmony 
                                                            
 318.  See discussion supra Part II. 
 319.  See discussion supra Part III. 
 320.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 321.  Harrison, On Marriage, and Polygamy, supra note 9, at 6 (presenting an 
earlier version of this discussion). 
 322.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595-96.  
 323.  See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). 
 324.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
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in living . . . [and] a bilateral loyalty.”325 
The issue in Griswold was whether the state of Connecticut could 
prevent married couples from using contraception.326  In other words, the 
question before the Supreme Court was whether actions taken within the 
marital relationship to prevent procreation deserved protection under the 
rubric of the privacy or liberty interest inherent in the marriage bond.327  
The Court found that the state’s interest in banning contraception for 
married persons, while perhaps encouraging procreation, was an 
impermissible interference in the intimate relationship of “bilateral loyalty” 
that created a marriage.328  Thus, the Court in Griswold clearly found that 
marriage was deserving of protection not solely because it was the locus for 
procreation and the rearing of children, but rather because there was some 
protectable liberty interest inherent in the institution of marriage itself.329 
In Turner v. Safley,330 the Court faced a state policy that placed 
significant restrictions on the ability of inmates to marry.  In striking down 
these restrictions as unconstitutional, the Court stated the following: 
 
“[Marriages] are expressions of emotional support and public 
commitment . . . [which] are an important and significant aspect of the 
marital relationship.”331 
 
“[M]any religions recognize marriage as having spiritual 
significance; . . . [therefore], the commitment of marriage may be an 
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal 
dedication.”332 
 
“[The] marital status often is a precondition of the receipt of government 
benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by 
the entirety, inheritance rights), and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., 
legitimation of children born out of wedlock).”333 
 
As the Court described in Obergefell, the fundamental aspects of 
marriage described by the Court in Turner, including the spiritual 
                                                            
 325.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
 326.  Id. at 480. 
 327.  Id. at 485-86. 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). 
 331.  Id. at 95-96. 
 332.  Id. at 96. 
 333.  Id. 
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significance of marriage, are equally important for same-sex couples as for 
different-sex couples.334 
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court described the limits on the state 
regulation of marriage as those “reasonable regulations that do not 
significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship.”335  Where a State seeks to impose more intrusive or limiting 
restrictions on the right to marry, those restrictions must be “supported by 
sufficiently important state interests and [be] closely tailored to effectuate 
only those interests.”336 
At times, in developing its marriage jurisprudence, the Court has focused 
solely on the protected interests of the individual participants to the 
relationship.337  Yet, at other times, the Court’s focus has been on the 
family unit as a whole, often particularly focused on the interests of 
children who may live within that family construct.338  For example, in 
                                                            
 334.  This certainly does not mean that civil recognition of same-sex marriage forces 
religious bodies to perform sacramental or quasi-sacramental ceremonies of spiritual 
recognition for such relationships, as some now seem to believe.  Today, it seems 
inconceivable that for years many religious bodies in America would not perform the 
religious rite of marriage for couples of different races, even in locations where such 
relationships were recognized under the civil law.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Loving, while striking down all prohibitions on the civil recognition of interracial 
marriage, did nothing to alter the right of religious bodies to refuse to perform religious 
ceremonies bestowing the religious rite of marriage upon interracial couples.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  See also State v. Barclay, 708 P.2d 972, 977 (1985) (upholding an 
ordained Baptist minister’s right to be free from state coercion, including criminal 
prosecution, as a result of his refusal to perform interracial marriages because they 
violated his religious beliefs).  For an interesting discussion of the history of marriage 
in America, see NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION (2d ed., Harvard U. Press 2000). 
 335.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
 336.  Id. at 386. 
 337.  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987) (holding that the 
fundamental right to marry extends to inmates); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967) (“[T]he freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 338.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental 
right and the foundation of family in society).  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 68-69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is 
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm 
of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”).  See generally EVAN WOLFSON, 
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 
(2004) (describing the different dimensions of marriage in the United States).  But see 
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 814 (11th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that foster families should be afforded the 
same protections as traditional “family units” by upholding Florida’s ban on adoption 
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Zablocki, the Court stated: 
 
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same 
level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child 
rearing, and family relationships . . . [since] it would make little sense to 
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life 
and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the 
foundation of the family in our society.339 
 
What is clear, however, in all of the Court’s marriage jurisprudence is 
that the Court sees the fundamental right to marry as having a separate 
existence—independent from the fundamental rights to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, or family relationships.  The right to marry does 
not exist solely to realize the rights to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, 
or family relationships.340  In fact, the Court has held that a constitutionally 
protected right to sexual activity or to child rearing exists outside the 
sphere of marriage.341 
The Court has articulated its understanding that the “composition of 
families varies greatly from household to household[,]” and that the 
“demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an 
average American family.”342  In fact, when the Court discusses a 
fundamental interest in childrearing, it must assume all of the various ways 
in which persons become parents and create a parent/child relationship.343 
Gay and lesbian individuals and couples have adopted children, some 
have had children that were biologically conceived through artificial 
                                                            
by gay and lesbian individuals). 
 339.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
 340. Id.; Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-95 (holding that the fundamental right to marry 
extends to inmates); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“[T]he freedom to marry or not marry, a 
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State.”).  See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69. 
 341.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248, 257 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  See e.g., Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
 342.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
 343.  Id. at 66.  Under existing Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that a child who 
is being raised by her biological mother and the mother’s lesbian partner, who has 
legally adopted the child, or a child being raised by her biological mother and father in 
a polygamous relationship, has a constitutionally protected interest in the parent/child 
relationship.  Likewise, no one could legitimately argue that the two legal parents of 
this child do not also have a constitutionally protected interest in child rearing or in the 
family relationship.  Rather, a legally recognized parent/child relationship, by its very 
existence, implicates a fundamental interest that is provided constitutional protection, a 
fundamental interest that can be interfered with only for some compelling state interest.   
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insemination and surrogacy, and some have children that were the product 
of a previously existing marriage.344  Little doubt should exist that these 
individuals and their children have a right to privacy and liberty with 
respect to matters of family life under the Court’s prior decisions.345  It 
makes “little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other 
matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the 
relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.”346  It was 
within this context of the Court’s marriage jurisprudence that the Court 
addressed the issue of same sex marriage presented in Obergefell. 
B.  The Majority Opinion – Justice Kennedy Writes347 
 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest 
ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family.  In forming a 
marital union, two people become something greater than once they 
were.  As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage 
embodies a love that may endure even past death.  It would 
misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of 
marriage.  Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that 
they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.  Their hope is not to be 
condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s 
oldest institutions.  They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.  
The Constitution grants them that right.348 
 
On June 26, 2015, the anniversary date of Justice Kennedy’s opinions in 
both Lawrence and Windsor, the Court issued its decision in Obergefell.349  
                                                            
 344.  See generally Wolfson, supra note 338; Molly Cooper, Note, Gay And Lesbian 
Families In The 21st Century: What Makes a Family? Addressing the Issue of Gay and 
Lesbian Adoption, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 178, 180-81 (2004).  But see Lofton v. Sec’y of 
the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 808-09 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g en 
banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) 
(upholding Florida’s ban on adoption by gay and lesbian individuals)).  The full 11th 
Circuit Court of Appeals voted 6-6 on whether to rehear the case en banc.  The result of 
this tie vote was that the case was not reheard.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
refused to hear an appeal of the case.  
 345.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.  See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.  
 346.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1974). 
 347.  Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, supra note 9 (manuscript at 58) 
(presenting an earlier version of this discussion of the majority opinion in Obergefell 
focused on the implications of the Obergefell decision on future challenges to state 
bans against the recognition of polygamous marriages and other polyamorous 
relationships). 
 348.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 349.  Id. at 2584. 
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In a 5-4 decision, with Justice Kennedy writing for the Court, the Court 
answered the two questions presented in Obergefell as follows: “The 
Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two 
people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of 
the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-
of-State.”350  As he had in his opinions in the three prior major gay rights 
cases decided by the Court, Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy rooted his decision in concepts of liberty, equality, and dignity, 
extending his understanding that analysis rooted in due process and equal 
protection were inextricably bound together.351 
Similar to his opinion in Lawrence where he attacked the Court’s prior 
framing of the homosexual sodomy question in Bowers, Justice Kennedy 
was first concerned with how the question before the Court in Obergefell 
was to be framed.352  Justice Kennedy rejected the notion that the question 
before the Court was simply whether there was a constitutional right to gay 
marriage.353  Rather, Justice Kennedy sought to frame the question before 
the Court within the context of the evolution of the understanding of 
marriage and the evolution of the Court’s marriage jurisprudence as 
described above.354 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy concluded that marriage was a 
fundamental right under the Constitution, outlining four separate principles 
that were at the core of defining this fundamental right.355  Justice Kennedy 
articulated these core principles as follows: 
 
“the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the 
concept of individual autonomy” creating an “abiding connection 
between marriage and liberty;”356 
 
marriage “supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance 
to the committed individuals;”357 
 
“protecting the right to marry . . . . safeguards children and families and 
thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
                                                            
 350.  Id. at 2588.  See also id. at 2593-2608. 
 351.  Id. at 2594, 2597-98. 
 352.  Id. at 2601-02. 
 353.  Id. 
 354.  Id. at 2595-2597.   
 355.  Id. at 2593-2602. 
 356.  Id. at 2599. 
 357.  Id. at 2599-2600. 
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education;”358 and 
 
“marriage is a keystone of our social order.”359 
 
With these core principles in mind, Justice Kennedy identified the 
question before the Court as being whether limiting marriage solely to 
opposite sex couples, to the exclusion of same-sex couples was manifestly 
inconsistent with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry.360  
Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the argument that gay and lesbian 
couples were not simply seeking “to exercise the right to marry,” but rather 
were asking for the recognition of “a new and nonexistent ‘right to same-
sex marriage.’”361  As Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial marriage”; Turner did not 
ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a 
“right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.”  Rather, each 
case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking 
if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from 
the right.362 
 
Justice Kennedy did not explicitly state whether the case was being 
decided on due process or equal protection grounds.  However, what is 
much clearer in Obergefell, as opposed to Justice Kennedy’s three prior 
gay rights opinions, is that no choice between due process and equal 
protection analysis need be made, because as he sees the Constitution, these 
two constitutional clauses are inextricably tied together under the umbrella 
of personal dignity.363 
As in the Romer / Lawrence / Windsor trilogy, in Obergefell, Justice 
Kennedy employed some form of heightened scrutiny, but one not rooted 
in the traditional concerns about suspect groups or classifications.364  In 
Obergefell, the analysis begins with the idea that marriage is a fundamental 
right under the due process clause, thus subjecting exclusions from that 
                                                            
 358.  Id. at 2600-01. 
 359.  Id. at 2601. 
 360.  Id. at 2601-03. 
 361.  Id. at 2602. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Id. at 2602-05.  See also discussion supra, Part II; Elizabeth B. Cooper, The 
Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 13-21 (2015) (discussing the concept of 
dignity in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence). 
 364.  Id. at 2597-2605. 
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right to heightened scrutiny.365  In Obergefell, therefore, the question was 
whether there existed a substantial or compelling, let alone rational, basis 
for the exclusion of same-sex couples from the fundamental right of 
marriage.366  In the Court’s analysis, the answer to this question was an 
unequivocal “No.” 
C.  The Dissents: More “Legalistic Argle Bargle”367 
The dissenting opinions were consistent with the dissents that had been 
authored in response to Justice Kennedy’s prior gay rights opinions in the 
Romer / Lawrence / Windsor trilogy.  Chief Justice Roberts’s primary 
objection was on what he saw as the anti-democratic nature of the decision, 
cutting off the robust debate that had been taking place already in the 
states.368  Justice Roberts also clearly saw this decision and the analysis 
employed by Justice Kennedy as reviving the often criticized substantive 
due process analysis employed during the Lochner era, a case he referenced 
some sixteen times in his dissent.369  Chief Justice Roberts places the 
analysis employed by Justice Kennedy in the Lochner-ian substantive due 
process tent, offering a scathing criticism of Lochner and its approach to 
substantive due process analysis, which, according to Chief Justice 
Roberts, allows judges to turn “personal preferences into constitutional 
mandates.”370 
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justice Thomas and 
Justice Alito, challenged the assertion by the majority that the First 
Amendment would provide adequate protections for those who held 
religious objections to same-sex marriage.371  Chief Justice Roberts 
expressed concern that certain religious institutions may be in danger of 
losing their tax-exempt status if they discriminate against married same-sex 
couples.372  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, the Solicitor General 
acknowledged this possibility at oral argument.373 
For his part, Justice Thomas, relying upon various amicus briefs, 
asserted that the decision would have “unavoidable and wide-ranging 
                                                            
 365.  Id. at 2598-99. 
 366.  Id. at 2604-05. 
 367.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 368.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611-12, 2624-26 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 369.  Id. at 2615-22 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 370.  Id. at 2618 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 371.  Id. at 2625-26 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 372.  Id. (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 373.  Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
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implications for religious liberty.”374  Without any historical or legal 
support for the position, Justice Thomas nevertheless argued that it is “all 
but inevitable” that religious institutions will be confronted with demands 
to “participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex 
couples.”375 
Writing separately, Justice Alito expressed his fear that while those who 
objected to same-sex marriage may be allowed to “whisper their thoughts 
in the recesses of their homes,” such persons and groups would be “labeled 
as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.”376  
Further, Justice Alito argued that by placing laws denying recognition of 
same-sex marriage on equal footing with laws denying equal treatment for 
African Americans and women, the majority was simply providing 
ammunition for those who would seek to vilify those who objected to 
same-sex marriage.377 
In dissent, Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas offer very little in the way 
of specific legal analysis.  Rather, their approach is to simply attack the 
majority for what they see as a usurpation of power, or as Justice Scalia 
writes, ignoring the actual constitutional structure of the Federal 
government and the role of the Supreme Court in that structure: “Today’s 
decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-
to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.”378  
Justice Alito joined in this attack, stating: “A lesson that some will take 
from today’s decision is that preaching about the proper method of 
interpreting the Constitution or the virtues of judicial self-restraint and 
humility cannot compete with the temptation to achieve what is viewed as a 
noble end by any practicable means.”379  Further, rather than addressing the 
precedents established by the Court in both its marriage jurisprudence and 
in the Romer / Lawrence / Windsor gay rights trilogy, the dissenters simply 
ignored the Court’s precedents and resorted to ad hominem attacks on the 
majority, as exemplified by this statement from Justice Scalia’s dissent: 
 
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion 
for the Court that began: ‘The Constitution promises liberty to all within 
its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, 
within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity,’ I would hide 
my head in a bag.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
                                                            
 374.  Id. at 2638-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 375.  Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 376.  Id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 377.  Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 378.  Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 379.  Id. at 2643 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and 
Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.380 
 
V.  CONCLUSION: WHAT NOW? 
While much justifiable celebration occurred among gay and lesbian 
persons and their allies following the decision in Obergefell, it is critical to 
place this decision in its proper context along the journey toward greater 
inclusion of gay and lesbian persons within American society and toward 
greater protections from discrimination for gay and lesbian persons.  In a 
recent essay in the Yale Law Journal Forum, Professor Katie Eyer smartly 
argues that while the decision in Obergefell may have many parallels with 
the decision in Loving, finding bans on interracial marriage 
unconstitutional, there is a profound and fundamental difference between 
where these two decision lie along the trajectory toward “the 
institutionalization of a formal equality regime (that is, a legal regime in 
which discrimination against a group is presumptively unlawful).”381  As 
Professor Eyer points out: 
 
Whereas Loving marked the endpoint of an era of the institutionalization 
of formal racial equality norms in constitutional Equal Protection 
doctrine and in federal statutory law, Obergefell stands much closer to 
the beginning of such a process.  Indeed, although the L/G/B rights 
movement has achieved substantial success—in shifting public opinion, 
and in securing litigation victories— explicit guarantees of formal 
equality have—at least at the federal level— largely remained elusive.382 
 
Given the reaction to the decision in Obergefell, it seems clear that 
                                                            
 380.  Id. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 381. See generally Katie Eyer, Brown, Not Loving: Obergefell And The Unfinished 
Business Of Formal Equality, 125 YALE L.J. Forum 1, 1-2 n.3 (2015) [hereinafter Eyer, 
Not Loving: Obergefell].  In her essay, Professor Eyer defines “formal equality” in the 
following manner: “‘formal equality’ signifies a legal regime in which invidious use of 
a particular classification is deemed presumptively unlawful.  In the statutory domain, 
this generally takes the form of an explicit statutory proscription on discrimination on 
the basis of a particular characteristic, and, in the contemporary constitutional domain, 
generally takes the form of “protected class” status triggering heightened scrutiny.”  Id. 
at n.3.  See also Katie Eyer, Have We Arrived Yet?  L/G/B Rights and the Limits of 
Formal Equality, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 159, 160-63 (2010); Devon Carbado et al., 
After Inclusion, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 87-88 (2008); cf. Tomiko Brown-
Nagin, The Civil Rights Canon: Above and Below, 123 YALE L.J. 2698, 2719-21 
(2014). 
 382.  Eyer, Not Loving: Obergefell, supra note 381, at 2.  
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Professor Eyer is correct in her assessment of the historical placement of 
Obergefell.  For the gay and lesbian rights movement, it seems clear that 
Obergefell is more akin to Brown than to Loving in the process toward 
greater inclusion and securing “explicit guarantees of formal equality.”383 
Obergefell leaves gay and lesbian persons in the rather odd position of 
having their marriage legally protected in every state in the union and at the 
federal level, while at the same time being denied protections from 
discrimination in employment,384 housing, and public accommodations385 at 
both the federal level and in the twenty-nine states that do not have 
statewide protections based on sexual orientation or gender identity.386  
Thus, for example, gay and lesbian couples can be married and have their 
marriage legally recognized in Ohio or Kentucky today, and then be 
lawfully fired from their job or evicted from their home tomorrow simply 
for being gay or lesbian, a fact that might be revealed when an employee 
exercises his or her constitutional right to marry someone of the same 
gender.387  Likewise, Obergefell does not answer whether it was unlawful 
for an employer to deny spousal benefits to gay and lesbian couples who 
were legally married in one state prior to Obergefell, on the basis that the 
couple’s state of residence and employment did not recognize their 
marriage.388  This lack of institutional formal equality will define and drive 
                                                            
383.   Id.  
 384.  Id. at 7-8 n.31 (providing a demonstrative list of employment cases brought 
under Title VII alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation wherein the 
disposition of the case in favor of the employer was based on the lack of any formal 
equality statutory scheme protecting against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
 385.  Id. at 7 n.30 (noting that public accommodations law, the body of 
antidiscrimination law governing access to services like restaurants hotels and service 
providers, is also largely governed by statute, rather than the Constitution.  There is 
very little, if any, ability for L/G/B litigants to bring public accommodations claims 
under federal law, because federal law does not proscribe sex discrimination in public 
accommodations, and sex discrimination is the primary argument that L/G/B litigants 
have relied on in the absence of explicit protections for sexual orientation). 
 386.  Id. at 7-11.  See also, e.g., David S. Cohen & Leonore Carpenter, Anti-Gay 
Bias Legal in Indiana Before New Law, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/31/indiana-religious-freedom-
restoration-act-discrimination-anti-gay-column/70723684  (noting that twenty-nine 
states do not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, and that few protections exist 
under federal law). 
 387.  See Maps of State Laws and Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/state_maps (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) (showing information on 
state protections for individuals based on sexual orientation or gender identity). 
388. This issue forms the crux of a lawsuit recently filed against Wal-mart, alleging that 
Wal-Mart’s pre-2014 policy of denying benefits to same-sex couples, unless required 
by state law, was unlawful.  See Steven Nelson, Wal-Mart Sued for Alleged Anti-Gay 
57
: At Long Last Marriage
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2016
HARRISON 10/1/15 (DO NOT DELETE)  
58 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 24:1 
the next steps in the development of greater LGBT inclusion and the 
fashioning of institutional formal equality. 
In an oddly prescient fashion, the concerns the dissenters raised in 
Obergefell regarding the protection of the religious liberties of those 
opposed to same-sex marriage may provide the battleground for the next 
steps for LGBT persons in attempting to achieve institutional formal 
equality.  Can public officials, such as county clerks, charged by state law 
with issuing marriage licenses, opt out of the constitutional requirements 
for marriages between persons of the same sex recognized in Obergefell 
based on their own personal religious objections?389  Can places of public 
accommodation, such as hotels, wedding venues, restaurants, or bakeries, 
in the absence of a state law prohibiting discrimination based on sexual 
orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, simply refuse to 
provide wedding services to gay and lesbian persons based on their own 
personal religious objections?390 
These very real questions being played out across the country following 
the decision in Obergefell show clearly that in the context of the 
development of an institutional formal equality for gay and lesbian persons, 
Obergefell is the beginning, as Brown was for the development of such a 
regime in the context of race, rather than a culmination of the construction 
of an institutional formal equality regime, as Loving represented.  
Following Loving, federal and state structures were already in place that 
made it unlawful for public officials, such as county clerks, who are 
charged by state law with issuing marriage licenses, to opt out of the 
constitutional requirements for marriages of persons between different 
races based on their own personal religious objections or for places of 
public accommodation, such as hotels, wedding venues, restaurants, or 
bakeries, to simply refuse to provide wedding services for interracial 
couples based on their own personal religious objections.  As Professor 
Eyer writes: 
 
                                                            
Discrimination, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/14/wal-mart-sued-for-alleged-anti-gay-
discrimination. 
 389.  See, e.g., Same-Sex Marriage Fight Turns to Clerks Who Refuse Licenses, 
NEW YORK TIMES (June 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/06/30/us/ap-us-gay-marriage.html.  See also 
Clerk Prayed Over Decision to Stop Issuing Marriage Licenses, NEW YORK TIMES 
(July 20, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/07/20/us/ap-us-gay-marriage-
county-clerks.html. 
 390.  See, e.g., Robert P. Jones, After Same-Sex Marriage, Then What?, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 24, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/after-
same-sex-marriage-then-what/396659/. 
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But marriage’s political, cultural, and social significance should not be 
mistaken for its legal centrality.  Unlike Loving, a favorable ruling for 
marriage equality in Obergefell is unlikely to establish a broader legal 
regime of formal equality in constitutional doctrine; and it is sure not to 
do so in the context of statutory rights.  As such, while Obergefell will 
no doubt have real significance—social, political, and, in part, legal—it 
should not be mistaken for formal equality.  For that unfinished business, 
as after Brown, much continuing work—in the courts, in the legislature, 
and among the people— lies ahead.391 
 
What remains after Obergefell is much work to be done to build a regime 
of institutional formal equality that provides protection for gay and lesbian 
persons not just in the context of marriage, but also in the much wider 
context of where individuals work and where they live and where they 
choose to seeks services.392  This is critical and important work that will be 
                                                            
 391.  Eyer, Not Loving: Obergefell, supra note 381, at 12. 
 392.  See, e.g., EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 14-15 (2015), available at 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2015/07/EEOC-gay-Title-VII-
decision.pdf (holding for the first time that the prohibition against discrimination based 
on “sex” contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes a prohibition 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation).  As the EEOC stated: 
 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on sex-based 
preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms.  “Sexual 
orientation” as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to 
sex.  A man is referred to as “ gay” if he is physically and/or emotionally 
attracted to other men.  A woman is referred to as “lesbian” if she is physically 
and/or emotionally attracted to other women.  Someone is referred to as 
“heterosexual” or “ straight” if he or she is physically and/or emotionally 
attracted to someone of the opposite-sex.  See American Psychological Ass’n, 
“Definition of Terms: Sex, Gender, Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation” (Feb. 
2011).  It follows, then, that sexual orientation is inseparable from and 
inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, that allegations of sexual orientation 
discrimination involve sex-based considerations.  One can describe this 
inescapable link between allegations of sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
discrimination in a number of ways. 
 
Sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily 
entails treating an employee less favorably because of the employee’s sex.  For 
example, assume that an employer suspends a lesbian employee for displaying a 
photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not suspend a male employee for 
displaying a photo of his female spouse on his desk.  The lesbian employee in that 
example can allege that her employer took an adverse action against her that 
the employer would not have taken bad she been male.  That is a legitimate 
claim under Title VII that sex was unlawfully taken into account in the 
adverse employment action.  See Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
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carried out through lobbying at the state and federal level and through the 
courts as increased litigation is brought in these arenas.  Obergefell 
provides the framework and impetus for much of this work, but it is merely 
the beginning of the work, not the end. 
 
                                                            
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (19 78) (“Such a practice does not pass the simple 
test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but 
for that person’s sex would be different.’”).  The same result holds true if the 
person discriminated against is straight.  Assume a woman is suspended 
because she has placed a picture of her husband on her desk but her gay colleague is 
not suspended after he places a picture of his husband on his desk.  The 
straight female employee could bring a cognizable Title VII claim of disparate 
treatment because of sex. 
 
Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added). 
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